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NOTES
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME NO LONGER SMELLS AS
SWEET: DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND THE AGE PROXY DOCTRINE AFTER
HAZEN PAPER CO. v. BIGGINS
INTRODUCTION
For nearly three decades, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA)I has been used to combat age bias in the work-
place. Seeking to eradicate unfounded, demeaning stereotypes about
the productivity of older workers and to promote the employment of
older workers based on their individual abilities rather than their age,
the ADEA prohibits "arbitrary"2 discrimination against workers age
forty and older "because of age."3 For age discrimination claims
brought under disparate treatment discrimination theory--the theory
employees most frequently rely on when asserting a claim under the
ADEA-an employer's liability depends on whether the employee's
age in fact motivated the employer. 4 Recognizing that an employer's
discriminatory motive is often disguised and hence difficult to prove,5
several courts, prior to Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, held that some fac-
tors, such as pension status, retirement eligibility, and seniority, are so
closely correlated with age that decisions based on these factors are
the functional equivalent of age-based decisions.6 Applying the "age
proxy" doctrine,7 these courts equated employment decisions based
on certain age-correlated factors with unlawful age discrimination
under the ADEA.8
In an attempt to "clarify the standards for liability" under the
ADEA and to thereby resolve a split among the circuits,9 the Supreme
Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins10 narrowed the scope of the age
proxy doctrine, rejecting the view that employment decisions based
on factors empirically correlated with age constitute unlawful age dis-
I Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
3 Id. § 623 (a) (1).
4 See infra part I.B.1.
5 See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
6 See infra part I.B.2.b.
7 See infra note 57.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
9 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 606 (1993).
10 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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crimination under the ADEA.11 Because age and factors empirically
correlated with age are "analytically distinct," the Supreme Court held
that an employer could "take account of one while ignoring the
other," such that a decision based on the age-related factor was "not
necessarily" age-based and therefore did not violate the ADEA.12
Although the Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility that an
employer could violate the ADEA by supposing a correlation between
age and an ostensibly age-neutral factor and "act[ing] accordingly,"13
the Court provided little guidance as to what remains of the age proxy
doctrine and what role that doctrine should assume in disparate treat-
ment discrimination cases following Hazen Paper.
This Note will examine the Court's narrow definition of the age
proxy doctrine in Hazen Paperand will explore whether that definition
adequately furthers the interests protected by the ADEA. Part I pro-
vides a brief overview of the legislative history and purposes of the
ADEA and the development of the age proxy doctrine under dispa-
rate treatment discrimination theory. Part II discusses the Court's de-
cision in HazenPaperand its rationale for limiting the scope of the age
proxy doctrine. Part III examines the likely impact of the Hazen Paper
decision, analyzes the problems of proving age-based employment dis-
crimination, and demonstrates the desirability of according the age
proxy doctrine a more prominent role in ADEA cases. That Part as-
serts that the language of the ADEA, its purposes, and the policy con-
siderations underlying its enactment support a broader application of
the age proxy doctrine than the Court advanced in Hazen Paper. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that it is disparate treatment discrimination
theory supplemented by the age proxy doctrine that truly "captures
the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA."14 It
proposes that broader application of the age proxy doctrine in age
discrimination cases would effect a more appropriate balancing of em-
ployer and employee interests than would the application of disparate
impact discrimination theory to ADEA claims.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the ADEA. Legislative History and Purpose
Enacted in 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was,
in part, an outgrowth of the civil rights movement. 15 However, con-
11 Id. at 609.
12 I at 611.
1 rd. at 613.
14 t at 610.
15 JosEPH E. KA=r, AGE DIscPJMINATIoN IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 1 (2d ed. 1990). The
ADEA was preceded by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified
19961
CORNELL LAW REV1EW
cern about age discrimination in employment was by this time, noth-
ing new. Legislative and executive initiatives to eliminate arbitrary age
discrimination in employment appeared as early as the 1950s.
16
Among these early efforts to combat ageism 17 in the workplace were
proposals to include protections for elderly workers in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 Although these proposals were ultimately
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994)), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 265, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)).
The ADEA has often been called a "hybrid" piece of legislation. See BARBARA L. SCHLEI
& PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCIMINArION LAW 485 (2d ed. 1983); Monte B. Lake,
Substantive Requirements Under the ADEA, in ADEA. A SYMPOSIUM HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS
AND PERSONNEL PRACTrIONERS 28, 35 (1983). Many of the ADEA's prohibitions parallel
Title VII provisions. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1994).
Other provisions, including the ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age" exception, 29
U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1994), closely resemble Equal PayAct (EPA) provisions, and the ADEA
explicitly incorporates Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enforcement mechanisms and
procedures, leaving courts and commentators to disagree on the applicability of Title VII,
EPA, and FLSA case law to ADEA claims. For a discussion of the dangers in "transplanting"
precedent developed under these other statutes to claims arising under the ADEA, see
DANIEL P. O'MEARA, PROTECTING THE GROWING NUMBER OF OLDER WORKERS: THE AGE DiS-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 82-96 (1989) (appraising the role of FLSA and Title VII
case law as applied to the ADEA); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978)
(applying FLSA precedent in determining the availability of a jury trial under the ADEA,
although acknowledging that "the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba
from Title VII"); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) ("That the
[ADEA] is embodied in a separate act and has its own unique history at least counsel the
examiner to consider the particular problems sought to be reached by the statute."); How-
ard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VI, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
ThreeActs and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAvE L. REv. 1093 (1993); Mack A. Player, Title V7I
Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropri-
ate?, 14 TOLEDO L. REV. 1261 (1983).
16 See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Bfore the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare; 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1967) (statement of Sen.
Javits). On February 12, 1964, PresidentJohnson issued an executive order establishing a
"federal policy" against age discrimination in employment. The policy banned age dis-
crimination in employment by federal contractors and subcontractors on account of age,
providing that federal departments and agencies should "take appropriate action to enun-
ciate the policy." Executive Order No. 11,141, 3 C.FR. 181 (1964-1965). Because it
neither provided a mechanism for its enforcement nor authorized a private cause of action
for its violation, the executive order was largely ineffective. See Kodish v. United Air Lines
Inc., 628 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1980); 1 EGLTrr, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 2.02, at 2-7 n.33
(2d ed. 1994). For a summary of early federal legislative and executive efforts to eliminate
age discrimination in the workplace, see Richard L. August, Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm LegislativeJudgment 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311,
1324-28 (1974).
17 "Ageism" has been defined as the "process of systematic stereotyping of and dis-
crimination against people because they are old." SeeJames E. Birren & Wendy L. Loucks,
Age Related Change and the Individua4 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 833, 833 (1981) (quoting R.
BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 12 (1975)). Dr. Robert Butler is generally
credited with coining the term. Id.
18 See 110 CONG. REC. 9911-16, 13,490-92 (1964) (Smathers amendment rejected in
the Senate); 110 CONG. REG. 2596-99 (1964) (Dowdy amendment rejected in the House); 1
JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF Er AL., ELDERLAW. AvocAcy FOR THE AGING § 3.31, at 77 n.2 (2d ed.
1993). This effort to include age discrimination among the practices prohibited by Title
VII has been characterized by some commentators as a "disingenuous" attempt led by
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rejected, Congress inserted a provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
instructing the Secretary of Labor to make a "full and complete study
of the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employ-
ment because of age" and to propose "recommendations for legisla-
tion to prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment because of
age."19
In response to Congress's directive, then-Secretary of Labor W.
Willard Wirtz issued a report entitled The Older American Worker: Age
Discrimination in Employment,20 detailing the problems older workers
faced as they attempted to retain employment The 1965 report docu-
mented the existence of widespread age discrimination in employ-
ment, but noted that ageism was very different from other forms of
workplace discrimination.2' Age discrimination in employment, un-
like race and gender discrimination, was not due to any dislike, intol-
erance, or "antagonism" toward older workers, but rather was based
on inaccurate stereotypes about older workers' declining abilities and
productivity.22 The report distinguished "arbitrary age discrimina-
tion" from job-related "circumstances," such as health factor differen-
tials, educational requirements, and changes in technology, "which
[adversely] affect older workers more strongly, as a group, than they
do younger workers,"23 and from a range of "institutional arrange-
ments that indirectly restrict the employment of older workers." 24
The report concluded that "decisions about aging and ability to
perform in individual cases. . may or may not be arbitrary discrimi-
nation on the basis of age, depending on the individual
circumstances."
25
Wirtz's 1965 report focused almost exclusively on discriminatory
hiring practices and employers' customary imposition of arbitrary age
limits on candidates for job openings-both of which had a marked
Southern opponents to Title VII to make the bill "so broad and 'unreasonable' as to keep
it from passing... to load it up in order to sink it." O'MEARA, supra note 15, at 11-12.
19 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 715, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
20 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMRIcAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT (1965), repinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HIS.
TORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT 16-41 (1981) [hereinafter 1965
REPORT]. For a thorough analysis of this report and its role in the legislative history of the
ADEA, see Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impac, in AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PER-
SONNEL PRACrITIONERS 68-115 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982). Relying on the legislative history
of the ADEA, Professor Blumrosen argues that intentional age discrimination "was the gra-
vamen of age discrimination" and that actions which have a disparate impact on older
workers were not intended to be prohibited under the ADEA. Id. at 73.
21 1965 REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
22 Id. at 5-6.
23 Id. at 11-14.
24 Id. at 15-17.
25 Id. at 5.
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effect on the employment of older workers.26 Citing the nation's loss
of productive manpower and the potential economic and psychologi-
cal effects of arbitrary age discrimination on older workers, the report
highlighted the injustice of judging workers based on group charac-
teristics rather than on their individual abilities. 27 The report
recommended legislative action to remedy this "arbitrary" age
discrimination.
28
Acting on Wirtz's recommendations, Congress enacted the ADEA
in 1967.29 Although the 1965 report was primarily concerned with
discriminatory hiring practices, Congress went further with the ADEA,
extending its proscription of arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
ment to all employment practices, including promotion, compensa-
tion, termination, and hiring decisions.30 Specifically, the ADEA
prohibits qualifying local, state, and private employers31 from refusing
to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against older workers
with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment "because of age."32 Nor may a qualifying employer
"limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
26 Id. at 6-10.
27 Id. at 18-19.
28 Secretary of Labor Wirtz was thereafter directed, under the Fair Labor Standards
Act Amendments of 1966, to prepare and submit a legislative proposal addressing the
problems of age discrimination in the workplace. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-602, § 606, 80 Stat. 845. On January 23, 1967, President Lyndon
Johnson delivered a special message to Congress in which he recommended that Congress
enact "a law prohibiting arbitrary and unjust discrimination in employment because of a
person's age." Aid for the Aged, 113 CONG. REc. 1087-90 (1967), reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGIs.rATIV HIsTORY OF THE AGE DIsciuMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT Acr 60-61 (1981). The next day, Wirtz submitted what was to become the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. See 113 CONG. Rc. 1377 (1967). The bill was
amended and ultimately signed into law on December 15, 1967. See Williams v. General
Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 126 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied; 455 U.S. 943 (1982); O'MEARA,
supra note 15, at 14.
29 The ADEA went into effect on June 12, 1968, 180 days after its enactment. See
Wilhliams, 656 F.2d at 126; Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th
Cir. 1972).
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1994).
31 The ADEA applies to employers "engaged in an industry affecting commerce"
which employ at least 20 employees for 20 or more weeks annually. Id. § 630(b). Qualify-
ing labor organizations and employment agencies are also bound by ADEA provisions. See
id. § 630(c)-(d). The prohibitions imposed on employment agencies are set out at id.
§ 623(b), (d)-(e), and those imposed on labor organizations may be found at id. § 623(c)-
(e).
The ADEA's protections also extend to most federaljob applicants and employees. See
id. § 633a. However, notwithstanding the ADEA, maximum hiring ages or mandatory re-
tirement ages for certain federal employees are imposed by statute. See 1 KRAUsKOPr, supra
note 18, § 3.33, at 79 n.4.
32 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1994).
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individual's age."33 In addition to these statutory prohibitions, Con-
gress instituted an "education and information program" as part of a
continuing effort to "reduc[e] barriers to the employment of older
workers and [to promote] measures for utilizing their skills."8 4
Congress's purpose in enacting the ADEA is set forth explicitly in
the Act's preamble: "to promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meet-
ing problems arising from the impact of age on employment."35 The
general "theme of the ADEA is 'to shift [the] focus away from chrono-
logical age and age-related barriers."'3 6 The ADEA protects workers
age forty and older from discrimination in the workplace "because of
... age";37 however, consistent with the recommendations made in
the 1965 report, the ADEA proscribes only "arbitray' age discrimina-
tion in employment.3 8 Although the ADEA does not expressly pro-
hibit employers from using age proxies,3 9 many lower courts have
33 Id. § 623(a) (2). The act also prohibits employers from reducing an employee's
wages to comply with the ADEA. See id. § 623(a) (3).
The ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination in employment is not, however, abso-
lute. See, for example, the exceptions embodied in id. § 623(f) (permitting age-based dis-
crimination where age is a "bona fide occupational qualification" or where necessary "to
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or... employee benefit plan") and in id.
§ 631(c) (permitting employers to impose mandatory retirement guidelines on "bona fide
executives" or individuals in "high policymaking positions").
34 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1994).
35 Id. § 621(b).
36 Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination Theoty Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Ac 74 N.C. L. REv.
267, 272 (1995) (foomote omitted from title) (quoting StevenJ. Kaminshine, The Cost of
Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FA. L. REv.
229, 235 (1990)).
37 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). As originally enacted, the ADEA applied only to em-
ployees age 40 to 65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-201,
§ 12, 81 Stat. 607. In 1978, Congress amended the ADEA, extending the upper age limit to
70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3,
92 Stat. 189. The 1986 amendments to the ADEA eliminated the age ceiling altogether.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c),
100 Stat. 3342.
38 Unlike Title VII, the ADEA prohibits only "arbitrary" discrimination in employ-
ment. Although "arbitrary" is mentioned no less than three times in the Act's preamble,
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994), nowhere does the ADEA specify what types of discrimination are
considered "arbitrary" or what in fact constitutes "discrimination" under the ADEA. The
ADEA's sparse legislative history likewise provides little guidance. However, in his 1965
report, The Older American Worker. Age Discrimination in Employmen Secretary of Labor W.
Willard Wirtz described "arbitrary discrimination" as the "rejection [of older workers] be-
cause of assumptions about the effect of age on their ability to do ajob when there is in fact
no basis for these assumptions." 1965 REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
39 Although the ADEA does not explicitly proscribe the use of age proxies, the
ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age" exception, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1994), im-
plicidy incorporates the age proxy doctrine, permitting differentiation among employees
based on "reasonable factors other than age" (emphasis added). See discussion infra part
IIIAl.
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recognized the age proxy doctrine as a necessary complement
to the ADEA's prohibition of arbitrary age-based employment
discrimination.
40
B. Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Origins of the
Age Proxy Doctrine
Employment discrimination claims have traditionally been ame-
nable to analysis under both disparate treatment and disparate impact
discrimination theories. However, the availability of disparate impact
discrimination theory as a basis for employer liability under the ADEA
remains an open question.41 Thus, in asserting a claim under the
ADEA, employees most frequently rely on disparate treatment dis-
crimination theory.
1. Disparate Treatment Discrimination
As applied to ADEA cases, disparate treatment discrimination in-
volves an employer's intentional unequal or dissimilar treatment of
similarly situated employees because of age.42 Proof of a discrimina-
tory motive is required. 43 An employer engages in unlawful age dis-
crimination if the employer relies on a formal, facially discriminatory
policy that treats older workers adversely or if the employer is, on an
ad hoc or informal basis, motivated by a protected employee's age in
making an employment decision.44 For an employer's actions to con-
stitute unlawful disparate treatment discrimination under the ADEA,
an employee's age need not be the "sole factor" the employer consid-
ers in making an employment decision. Age must, however, be "a de-
termining factor," in that "but for" the employee's age the employee
40 See infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
41 Disparate impact discrimination involves employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but which disproportionately affect members
of a protected group. See infra part III.B.1. The Supreme Court initially crafted the dispa-
rate impact doctrine in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a case involving
charges of race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court extended Griggs and its progeny to
sex discrimination cases. And in 1991, Congress expressly codified disparate impact dis-
crimination under Title VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
It is not clear whether claims of unlawful age discrimination can be established by a
showing of disparate impact. Although several of the lower courts have applied disparate
impact discrimination theory to alleged ADEA violations, see infra notes 237-49 and accom-
panying text, the Supreme Court has "never decided" whether disparate impact theory is
available under the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
Moreover, in the aftermath of Hazen Paper, several courts, acting on dicta set forth in
the case, have held that the disparate impact doctrine is not cognizable under the ADEA.
See infra note 255 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the applicability of disparate
impact theory to ADEA claims, see infra part III.B.
42 See discussion infra part IIIA2.
43 See infra text accompanying note 166.
44 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
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would not have been subjected to the differential treatment.4 Age
proxy discrimination is a "species" of disparate treatment discrimina-
tion theory under the ADEA.46
2. Origins of the Age Proxy Doctrine
In the ADEA context, proxies may be used by employers in one of
two ways. First, age may itself be used as a proxy for an employee's
skills or attributes. Second, a factor that is empirically correlated with
age, but not directly age-based, may be used as a proxy or surrogate
for age.
a. Using Age as a Proxy
In enacting the ADEA, Congress sought to prohibit the arbitrary
use of age as a proxy for an employee's productivity, ability, or compe-
tence.47 As the Sixth Circuit explained in Abbott v. Federal Forge Inc.,
48
"It] he ADEA is directly aimed at the evil of taking age into account in
making employment decisions, or using age as a proxy for some legiti-
mate factor, with which it is somewhat, but not totally correlated.
'49
An employer may not, therefore, generally rely on age as a proxy for
an employee's abilities or skills; the employer must, instead, focus on
those factors directly.
The ADEA, however, contains an "escape clause," 50 permitting
employers, in very limited circumstances, to make age-based employ-
ment decisions. Commonly referred to as the "BFOQ" exception, an
employer may lawfully engage in discriminatory practices that would
otherwise be prohibited by the ADEA when "age is a bonafide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business."5'
45 See, e.g., Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 918 (1993); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
817 (1985); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984);
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975).
46 Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992); see also
Robert J. Gregory, There is Life in That Old (I Mean More "Senior") Dog Yet: The Age-Proxy
Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HosrRT LAB. L.J. 391, 393 n.14 (1994) ("The
thrust of the proxy theory is that the age-related factor is a stand-in for age itself. Such a
theory falls under the disparate treatment wing of the statute.").
47 See, e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1399 & n.2 (3d
Cir.) (Adams,J., dissenting) ("Apparently cognizant that the aging process can affect capa-
bility, Congress drafted the ADEA to distinguish carefully between those employment deci-
sions that are arbitrary and those that are performance-related."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087
(1984).
48 912 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990).
49 1d. at 876.
50 Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1225 (1st Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1832 (1994).
51 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1994) (emphasis added).
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In Western Air Lines v. Criswel,52 the Supreme Court articulated a
two-prong test for determining when an employer could legally take
age into account when making business decisions. Under the first
prong, an employer must show that the particularjob qualification is
"reasonably necessary to the essence of his [or her] business."5 The sec-
ond prong requires the employer to justify his or her use of age as a
proxy for that qualification. The employer must show either (1) that
age is almost perfectly correlative with the qualification, such that it is
reasonable for the employer to believe that all or substantially all per-
sons over a certain age would be unable to perform the duties of the
job; or (2) that it is "highly impractical" for the employer to screen for
the qualification on an individualized basis.54 The BFOQ exception
is, however, an "extremely narrow exception" to the ADEA's general
prohibition of age-based employment practices.
55
b. The Age Proxy Doctrine
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins,56 many lower courts recognized that an employment decision
based on a seemingly age-neutral factor could operate as the func-
tional equivalent of an overt, age-based employment decision. Apply-
ing what has become known as the "age proxy" doctrine, these courts
equated employment decisions based on certain age-correlated factors
("age proxies") with unlawful age discrimination under the ADEA.
57
In Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,58 for example, the Seventh
Circuit intimated that an employer could not evade the ADEA's pro-
scription of age discrimination in employment by differentiating
52 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
53 Id at 413 (adopting the two-part test outlined in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976)).
54 Id. at 414-20.
55 Id at 412 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)). See generally
Bernice L Neugarten, Age Distinctions and Their Social Functions, 57 CHi.-Km'r L. REv. 809,
822-23 (1981) ("[T]he validity of using age as a proxy depends on the correspondence
between age and the characteristic for which it stands [;] ... the presumed correspondence
often is not based on good evidence, but age stereotypes.").
56 507 U.S. 604 (1993); see discussion infra part I.
57 In the first edition of his treatise on age discrimination Professor Howard Eglit
described the age proxy doctrine as follows:
Sometimes an employer, rather than using age as the basis for its decisions,
will rely on such factors as cost or seniority. As it turns out, however, these
factors are so closely correlated with age that most courts have pierced the
rhetoric and rejected employers' efforts. In other words, because typically
(although not inevitably) seniority-i.e., years on the job-will correlate
with age, use of seniority by an employer as a basis for decisionmaking, such
as selecting the most senior employees for discharge, will be seen as a dis-
guised reliance on age.
2 HowARD C. EGu-r, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 16.03A, at 2S-97 to 2S-98 (Supp. 1992).
58 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
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among employees on the basis of grey hair.59 Likewise in EEOC v.
Borden's, Inc.,60 the Ninth Circuit observed that an employer's dissimi-
lar treatment of employees based on their retirement status violated
the ADEA.61
Under the age proxy doctrine, liability for unlawful age discrimi-
nation ensues not because the consequences of an employer's deci-
sion tend to disproportionately affect older workers, 6 2 but because
when an employer relies on certain age-correlated factors in making
an employment decision, "it can be fairly assumed that age was in fact
the reason for the decision."63 In other words, the age-correlated fac-
tor is regarded as simply a mask for or a means of disguising the em-
ployer's discriminatory animus and motive.64 Among the factors
which, prior to Hazen Paper, many of the lower courts had deemed
impermissible proxies for age are: seniority or years of service,65
pension status,6 6 retirement eligibility,67 salary costs, 68 longevity or
59 Id. at 1163.
60 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
61 Id. at 1393.
62 For a general discussion of disparate impact discrimination theory, see infra part
IH.B.
63 Gregory, supra note 46, at 421.
64 The applicability of the age proxy doctrine to a particular case is often addressed in
the context of whether an employer's reliance on a factor ostensibly unrelated to age quali-
fies as a "reasonable factor other than age" for purposes of the ADEA's RFOA exception.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1994). See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.
1984) (retirement status is not a "reasonable factor other than age"); EEOC v. Community
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902, 905 (S.D. Ill. 1986) ("notification of an intent to
retire is so inexorably linked with age that it cannot be viewed as a separate factor").
65 See, e.g., Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983)
("[D]iscrimination on the basis of factors, like seniority, that invariably would have a dispa-
rate impact on older employees, is improper under the ADEA"). But see Williams v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130 n.17 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[S]eniority and age
discrimination are unrelated."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
66 See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir.
1992) (union policy prohibiting retired members from seeking employment through its
hiring hall while receiving pension benefits violates ADEA because it discriminates "on the
basis of a factor very closely related to age"); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati, & Mazzota
P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1987) (termination of employee to prevent pension
from vesting constitutes a valid claim under the ADEA); EEOC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 632
F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1980) (discharge based on employees' entitlement to pension
benefits violates the ADEA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981); EEOC v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 43 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 736 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (policy excluding pension-eligi-
ble employees from receiving severance pay violates the ADEA).
67 See, e.g., Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 1992) ("strong anecdotal
evidence" that employer fires employees before they reach retirement age in order to save
on retirement benefits was evidence of age discrimination), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918
(1993); Castieman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 1992) (termination of
employee only eight months before he reached retirement age was evidence of age dis-
crimination); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (retirement
status is not a "reasonable factor other than age"); Thompson v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 51
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,411, 59,781 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying employer's motion for
summaryjudgment on grounds that the employer's termination of older, higher-paid em-
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future work expectancy, 69 experience,70 overqualification, 7 ' and
tenure.
72
Case law applying the age proxy doctrine can be divided into two
categories. One category of cases involves employment decisions
based on age-correlated factors which, by their nature, can affect only
those individuals within the protected group. For example, character-
istics such as retirement eligibility or pension status, when vesting is
based on age or on many (e.g., thirty) years of service, can be pos-
ployees under reorganization plan could violate the ADEA); EEOC v. Community Unit
Sch. Dist. No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902, 905 (S.D. Ill. 1986) (reclassification of employees be-
cause of their intent to retire violates the ADEA); EEOC v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
618 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (denial of severance pay to employees eligible for early
retirement under employer's pension plan violates the ADEA); EEOC v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 666, 667 (D.N.J. 1982) (denial of severance pay to
employees eligible for retirement constitutes unlawful age discrimination).
68 See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1983) (singling out pen-
sion-eligible employees for involuntary retirement based on economic considerations vio-
lates the ADEA), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp.
939, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) ("An employer's desire to have the most cost-effective work force
cannot justify age discrimination where age is not a BFOQ."), affd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1985); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Where eco-
nomic savings and expectation of longer future service are directly related to an em-
ployee's age, it is a violation of the ADEA to discharge the employee for those reasons."),
affid in part, reu'd in part without opinion, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
69 See, e.g., Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (hiring
based on projected longevity of employment does notjustify age discrimination), affd, 770
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Wolfv. Ferro Corp., 772 F. Supp. 139, 142 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)
("An 'expectation of longer service' by a younger, retained employee has been held an
impermissible reason to discharge the older employee.") (quoting Marshall v. Arlene Knit-
wear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)).
70 See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1033 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he high corre-
lation between experience and membership in the protected age group... would render
application of the... [employment] policy discriminatory as a matter of law. .. ."), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
71 See, e.g., Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1991)
(although "a conclusory statement that a person is overqualified may easily 'serve as a mask
for age discrimination,'" an employer may decline to place an employee in a position for
which he is overqualified where overqualification may have a negative impact on perform-
ance); Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1991) (employer's claim
that it did not offer 56-year-old employee a new position because he was overqualified
could constitute age discrimination); Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)
("Denying employment to an older job applicant because he or she has too much experi-
ence, training or education is simply to employ a euphemism to mask the real reason for
refusal, namely, in the eyes of the employer the applicant is too old."); see also EEOC v.
District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 729 F. Supp. 907, 915 (D.D.C. 1990) (observ-
ing that "the very term 'over qualified and over specialized' is almost a buzzword for 'too
old'"). But see Stein v. National City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991) (where employer
defined "overqualification" in terms of an objective criterion-college degrees-failure to
hire overqualified applicant did not violate the ADEA).
72 See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983) (ten-
ure-based faculty selection plan violates the ADEA).
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sessed only by individuals over forty.73 Such factors have been held to
be "so inexorably linked with age" that they cannot reasonably be
viewed as separate factors.74
In EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters,75 for example, retired
members of a local plumbers' and pipefitters' union challenged a
union policy that prohibited members from making use of its employ-
ment services while receiving a pension from the union.76 Rejecting
the union's claim that its differentiation among members-based on
the member's "decision to retire and remain retired"77-was permissi-
ble under the ADEA, the Ninth Circuit concluded:
This proposed justification fails because it rests on pension receipt,
a status closely related to age. "A retired member receiving a pen-
sion"-a member necessarily aged 55 or older-is treated differ-
ently from other members seeking employment, for example, from
a member drawing unemployment benefits or a member employed
in another trade.
78
The second category of cases applying the age proxy doctrine en-
compasses decisions based on age-correlated attributes that workers
both within and outside the protected group may possess. For exam-
ple, salary-based employment decisions can affect young and old work-
ers alike, since the extent to which salary is a function of age depends
largely upon the age at which the employee began working for the
organization and the organization's policies with respect to rewarding
seniority and longevity in the form of higher wages. Some courts have
distinguished between these two types of cases, applying the age proxy
doctrine in the former category of cases, in which the age-related fac-
tor is perfectly correlated with age, but refusing to apply it in the
latter.79
73 See, e.g., White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988) (employee
discharged after 29 3/4 years to prevent payment of additional pension benefits which
would have accrued upon 30 years of service).
74 EEOC v. Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902, 905 (S.D. Ill. 1986); see
also EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1992) (union policy
prohibiting retired workers from seeking employment through its hiring procedures while
receiving a pension violated ADEA); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)
(employer's policy denying severance pay to retirement-eligible workers violates the
ADEA).
75 998 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1992).
76 Id. at 643.
77 Id. at 646.
78 Id. at 647.
79 Prior to Hazen Paper, although most courts adopted the age proxy doctrine in some
form, courts disagreed as to the extent of correlation necessary between age and an age-
correlated factor to warrant the age-correlated factor being accorded age proxy status. For
instance, the 8th Circuit required a "close relationship" between age and the age-corre-
lated factor. See, e.g., Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983) ("close
link between seniority and age"); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691
(8th Cir. 1983) ("close relationship between tenure status and age"). The Ninth Circuit
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c. Seniority, Longevity, and Retirement Status
One of the earliest cases to apply the age proxy doctrine was
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co. 80 In appraising the language of a separation
notice, which the plaintiff-employee claimed was evidence of his em-
ployer's discriminatory motive for dismissing the employee, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed, "'too many years on the job'
could have meant that the length of service itself, a factor inevitably
related to age, was the basis for the discharge ... and hence would
show discrimination."81
Similarly, in EEOC v. City ofAltoona,8 2 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that seniority, as it applied to a statutory reduction-
in-force plan, was "inexorably linked with age," and thus could not be
viewed as a "separate factor."83 The plan singled out pension-eligible
firefighters for involuntary retirement, requiring that the most senior,
retirement-eligible employees be laid off first. Emphasizing that "eco-
nomic considerations ... cannot be used to justify age discrimina-
tion," the court upheld employees' claims that the plan violated the
ADEA. 84
In White v. Westinghouse Electric Co.,85 the Third Circuit further
clarified its position regarding employers' consideration of age-corre-
lated factors when making employment decisions. Finding that the
timing of an employee's dismissal-just three months before the em-
ployee would have been entitled to increased pension benefits as a
result of his thirty years of service-constituted evidence of his em-
ployer's unlawful use of an age proxy,8 6 the court suggested that "com-
mon sense indicates that seniority and age are 'inexorably linked' in
any context" 87
applied a similar standard. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d
641, 646 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring a "very close connection between age and the factor on
which discrimination is based"). Other courts have enunciated standards that would seem
to encompass only those factors that correlate perfectly with age or are analytically indis-
tinct from age. See, e.g., EEOC v. Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902, 905
(S.D. I1. 1986) (An age-correlated factor that is "inexorably linked with age ... cannot be
viewed as a separate factor."); see also Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th
Cir. 1975) (A "factor inevitably related to age.., would show discrimination.").
80 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
81 Id. at 313.
82 723 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1983).
83 Id. at 6; see also Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc. 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983) (given
the "close link between seniority and age," characterizes seniority as an age proxy). Ac-
tions taken pursuant to "a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the
purposes of [the ADEA]" are, however, permitted under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(2)(A) (1994).
84 Altoona, 723 F.2d at 7 (citing Smallwood v. United AirLines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982)).
85 862 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1988).
86 Id. at 62.
87 Id. at 62 n.9.
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Other courts have applied a less exacting standard. In Williams v.
General Motors Corp.,88 for instance, the Fifth Circuit said simply, "sen-
iority and age discrimination are unrelated."8 9 The court explained:
The ADEA targets discrimination against employees who fall within
a protected age category, not employees who have attained a given
seniority status. This is borne out.., by the simple observation that
a 35-year old employee might have more seniority than a 55-year old
employee.... We state without equivocation that the seniority a
given plaintiff has accumulated entitles him to no better or worse
treatment in an age discrimination suit.90
Likewise, in Arnold v. United States Postal Service,91 which involved
the legality of a "senior-first" rule that mandated the transfer of the
most senior postal inspectors to major metropolitan areas, the D.C.
Circuit held that although "[there may well be cases in which senior-
ity is simply a code word for age discrimination," the "senior-first" rule
did not violate the ADEA.92 The court reasoned that it was "neither
fair nor reasonable" to assess the Postal Service's intentions in promul-
gating the policy "by uncoupling the rule from the other aspects of...
[the] program."93 The court concluded that when viewed in its
proper context, "the purpose of the senior-first rule was not to require
that the oldest postal inspectors be transferred, but to establish a ra-
tional and orderly system to ensure that all.., inspectors serve a tour
of duty in... [a major metropolitan area] prior to retirement."94
The correlation between age, seniority, and salary has similarly
invited litigation by rejected job applicants and terminated employees
challenging the legality of employment decisions based on the costs of
employing older workers. In fact, prior to Hazen Paper, cases involving
employment decisions based on the economics of hiring or retaining
older workers commanded perhaps the most attention of all age
proxy cases.
88 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cet. denied 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
89 Ia. at 130 n.17.
90 Id.; see also Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1087 (3d Cir. 1992) (re-
jecting proposition that "the ADEA protects an employee from an adverse employment
decision based on seniority") (emphasis omitted); Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp.,
936 F.2d 805, 813 (5th Cir. 1991) (employee's assertions that his seniority and greater
severance pay benefits affected employer's decision to terminate him was "not relevant to
age discrimination, but seniority"); Ludovicy v. Dunkirk Radiator Corp., 922 F.2d 109, 111
(2d Cir. 1990) ("[The] elimination or derogation of seniority rights is not sufficient by itself
to raise an inference of age discrimination.").
91 863 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989).





d. Salary: The Cost of Employing Older Workers
Because salary and benefit levels are often tied to an employee's
seniority within an organization, and experience frequently com-
mands higher pay, employers often find older workers more costly to
compensate than younger employees. Numerous courts have recog-
nized the correlation between salary, seniority, and age and have held
that termination of older, high-salaried employees in an effort to re-
duce costs "constitutes evidence" of an ADEA violation. 95
The leading case involving salary-based employment decisions is
Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc. 96 In Metz, a divided panel of the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the salary savings an employer sought to realize by dis-
charging an older employee and replacing him with a younger
employee constituted an impermissible proxy for age in violation of
the ADEA.97 Metz, aged fifty-four, was the company's second most
senior employee and, as result of his twenty-seven years of service and
receipt of annual raises, was among its highest-paid workers.98 The
court reasoned that given the strong correlation between Metz's
higher salary and his many years of satisfactory service, it would "de-
feat the intent" of the ADEA99 to permit his employer to replace him
95 See, e.g., Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1989) (replace-
ment of older employee with younger employee to save salary costs is not a defense to an
ADEA claim); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (where
economic savings are "directly related to age," an employer's reliance on them in discharg-
ing an older employee constitutes age discrimination); see also EEOC v. Clay Printing Co.,
955 F.2d 936, 946 (4th Cir. 1992) (Restani,J. dissenting) (observing that "numerous courts
have recognized the correlation between salary, seniority and age, and have held that dis-
charge of more senior and higher-salaried employees as a cost-savings measure constitutes
evidence of a violation of the [ADEA]") (citations omitted). The interpretative guidelines
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with the
administration and enforcement of the ADEA, similarly prohibit differential treatment
based on the cost of employing older workers. Section 1625.7(f) of the EEOC's interpreta-
tive guidelines provides:
A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees
as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which
qualify for the section 4(f) (2) exception to the Act.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (1995).
96 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
97 Id. at 1207-08.
98 Id. at 1203.
99 Holding that a tenure-based selection plan violated ADEA, the Eighth Circuit in
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983), similarly noted:
[B]ecause of the close relationship between tenure status and age, the plain
intent and effect of the defendants' practice was to eliminate older workers
who had built up, through years of satisfactory service, higher salaries than
their younger counterparts. If the existence of such higher salaries can be
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based solely on the higher cost of employing him.100 Although recog-
nizing the employer's use of "pay as a 'proxy' for age"'01 under the
facts of Metz, the court cautioned that the age proxy doctrine should
be "employed only on a case-by-case basis where the facts support its
use."102
100 Met, 828 F.2d at 1207. Metz should not be read to prohibit the termination of
older employees when dismissal is based on the employee's poor performance, rather than
seniority or age. Metz merely proscribes the replacement of satisfactory employees with
younger workers willing to perform the same tasks at a lower wage. See id. at 1206 n.7; see
also EEOC v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1478 (D.N.J. 1993); Donnelly v. Exxon
Research & Eng'g Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417 (D.NJ. 1974), affd without
opinion, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975).
101 Met, 828 F.2d at 1208.
102 Id. Although the Metz court stated that recognition of "pay as a 'proxy' for age" was
"inescapable in this particular case," it did not specify what facts supported this conclusion.
Id. Courts interpreting Metz have suggested, however, that the case might have come out
differently had the employer offered to retain the older employee at the lower wage com-
manded by his younger replacement. See, e.g., Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones
Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1991) (employer's refusal to em-
ploy ADEA protected employees at the higher wages they had received under a collective
bargaining agreement did not constitute age discrimination where the employees were
offered but refused employment at a lower wage); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d
867, 876 (6th Cir. 1990) ("By offering the job to older employees on the same terms as
younger, the employer would demonstrate that the employment practice is the cost-saving
measure it purports to be and not a pretext for age discrimination."); see also Note, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. 380, 399 (1976) (suggesting that
although courts "may be justified in according probative weight to evidence" that an em-
ployer failed to offer a position to an older worker at the lower wage, this position might
conflict with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) which prohibits employers from reducing the wage rate of
an employee in order to comply with the ADEA). But see Peter H. Harris, Note, AgeDiscrim-
ination, Wages, and Economics: What Judiial Standard7, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715
(1990) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) to prohibit employers from lowering the salary of
younger workers to match the salary of older, protected employees).
The District Court for the District of Connecticut apparently agreed with Metis case-
by-case approach, for in Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322 (D. Conn.
1988), the court distinguished those situations in which economic considerations would
qualify for age-proxy status from those in which they would not. The court stated:
Economic considerations which are simply a result of employing older em-
ployees do not constitute legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for either a
failure to hire them or their discharge.... Where economic considerations
are not a proxy for age, however, such factors may constitute legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons justifying an employer's actions. An actionable
ADEA claim cannot be premised on the mere fact that higher salaried
workers were terminated because a person may not be within the ADEA
protected class yet still receive a large salary because of particular qualifica-
tions, merit increases, or long tenure.
Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
Compare EEOC v. City ofAltoona, 723 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[Economic] consider-
ations cannot be used to justify age discrimination."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984) and
Orzel v. Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir.) (cost factors cannot justify
mandatory retirement), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983) with Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797
F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986) (where employee's salary was the result of merit raises and his
managerial position, employer's decision to discharge higher-paid, older employee to save
salary costs did not constitute unlawful age discrimination) and Nelson v. Kennicott Bros.
Co., No. 91-1254, 1991 WL 270013 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1991) (plaintiff's salary increases
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In an impassioned dissent,Judge Easterbrook objected to the ma-
jority's expansive application of the age proxy doctrine. Although
conceding that when wage is "directly dependent on" age, as in a lock-
step compensation program, courts should treat the two factors as
identical, Easterbrook argued that in cases such as Metz, the cost of
employing an older worker should qualify as a "reasonable factor
other than age."' 03
Following Judge Easterbrook's lead, a number of lower courts
have found employers' cost rationales convincing.10 4 Some courts
treat salary as an age-neutral, inherently reasonable criterion upon
which employers may base employment decisions, unless it can be
shown that an employer has used salary costs simply as a means of
"targeting" older workers.' 0 5 In Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.,' 0 6
for instance, the Second Circuit rejected an employee's claim that age
was a critical factor in his dismissal. The employee maintained that
based on performance, not seniority, so salary does not constitute a "proxy" for age under
Metz approach); see also Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 851 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("[WMage discrimination can be a proxy for age discrimination, so that lopping
off high salaried workers can violate the ADEA-although the circumstances under which
this holds true remain to be determined.").
103 Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). As Judge Easterbrook ex-
plained further:
Wage discrimination is age discrimination only when wage depends directly
on age, so that the use of one is a pretext for the other, high covariance is
not sufficient, and employers always should be entitled to consider the rela-
tion between a particular employee's wage and his productivity.
Id. at 1212.
104 See, e.g., Wheeldon v. Monon Corp., 946 F.2d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 1991) (while con-
ceding that "pensions may be used as a proxy for age," court declined "to rule that pension
considerations always operate as such" and found that employer's alleged use of independ-
ent military pension in decision to discharge employee did not operate as an impermissible
age proxy); Holt v. Gamewell, 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986) (where employee's salary was
the result of merit raises and his managerial position, employer's decision to discharge
sixty-three-year-old employee to save salary costs did not constitute unlawful age
discrimination).
Even before Hazen Paper, the 7th Circuit, in Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates,
Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991), questioned the appropriateness of treating evidence of
an employer's discharge of employees to save pension expenses as evidence of age
discrimination:
Age and pension expenses are correlated, though they are not the same
thing. There is an analytical difference, certainly, between firing a person
on the basis of a stereotyped view of older workers' energy, flexibility, initia-
.tive, and other employment attributes, and firing him to save money. Nev-
ertheless a number of cases hold that it is age discrimination to replace an
older employee with a younger one for the sole purpose of economizing on
salary costs.
Id. at 658.
The Viser court ultimately concluded that neither the employee's age, nor the fact that he
incurred a loss of pension benefits when discharged and was replaced by a younger worker
was "evidence of age discrimination." Id. at 658-59.
105 See infra note 108 (listing relevant cases).
106 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991).
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since his high salary was "'a direct function of his longevity, experi-
ence, seniority or periodic salary raises,'" the employer's considera-
tion of his high salary in deciding to discharge him violated the
ADEA. 107 Finding no unlawful age discrimination, the court noted
that the ADEA does not prevent employers from making reasonable
economic choices so long as employers base their decisions on factual
realities and not on stereotypical biases about the abilities of older
workers:
[T]here is nothing in the ADEA that prohibits an employer
from making employment decisions that relate an employee's salary
to contemporaneous market conditions and the responsibilities en-
tailed in particular positions and concluding that a particular em-
ployee's salary is too high. To be sure, high salary and age may be
related, but, so long as the employer's decisions view each employee
individually on the merits ... and are based solely on financial
considerations, its actions are not barred by the ADEA.' 08
107 Id. at 117 (quoting appellant's brief at 10-12).
108 Id. at 117; see also Hamilton v. Grocers Supply Co., 986 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir.)
("[T]his Court has not adopted the Metz line of reasoning, and we decline to do so in this
case."), cert. denieA 508 U.S. 960 and 114 S. CL 77 (1993); Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories
Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 813 (5th Cir. 1991) (termination due to higher pay is "not relevant to
age discrimination, but seniority"); EEOC v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434
(8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument that when experience requires higher pay under em-
ployer's compensation schedule, employer's decision to hire a younger, less experienced
individual to save money violates the ADEA); Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 1379,
1389 (W.D.N.C. 1992) ("The 'wage is a proxy for age' theory has been specifically rejected
by this Court.") (citing Latimore v. University of North Carolina, 669 F. Supp. 1345
(W.D.N.C. 1987), affid in part, remanded in part, 856 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1988)); Mastie v.
Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1818-19 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (employer need not
ignore costs associated with older worker's higher salary). Some courts have permitted
employers to perform a cost-benefit analysis, comparing the return on the dollar of the
performance levels and salary costs of older workers, so long as the calculation is done on
an individual basis rather than based on the cost and benefits of employing older workers
as a group. See, e.g., Mastie, 424 F. Supp. at 1319 (higher costs associated with employing
older workers constitute a "reasonable factor other than age" so long as costs considered
"upon an individual as opposed to a general assessment that the older worker's cost of
employment is greater than for other workers"); see also O'MARA, supra note 15, at 122-31;
Clint Bolick, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Equal Opportunity orReverseDiscrimina-
tion?, PoucvANAsLsis, Feb. 10, 1987; Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
90 HAtv. L. Ray. 380, 399 (1976). See generally Kaminshine, supra note 36 (advocating a
"balanced approach for assessing the legitimacy of seniority-salary criteria and employer
cost needs under the ADEA" based on disparate impact analysis); Terrence P. Colling-
sworth, Note, The Cost Defense under the Age Discrimination in Employment Ac4 1982 DuKE LJ.
580 (arguing that termination based on cost is consistent with the ADEA only if cost is
based on employee's output, not absolute cost); Harris, supra note 102 (interpreting 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) as prohibiting employers from lowering the salary of younger employees to
match the salary of older, protected employees); Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business
Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE LJ. 565 (1979) (discharging
an older employee because of direct costs such as higher salaries and fringe benefits




Other courts have modified Judge Easterbrook's approach, per-
mitting employers to consider the relative costs of employing older
workers under a narrow set of circumstances. In EEOC v. Chysler,'09
the Sixth Circuit developed a two-part test for determining when an
employer might legitimately consider the additional salary and benefit
costs incurred in employing older workers. When faced with the
"prospect of imminent bankruptcy," the court held that an employer
couldjustify a forced retirement policy, putting forth, as a "reasonable
factor other than age," the economic needs of the company." 0 The
employer must show: (1) a "real" need for "drastic cost reduction"
and (2) that the employer's action was the "least-detrimental-
alternative.""'
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the case law reflects
disagreement among the lower courts regarding the proper scope of
the age proxy doctrine and what types of age-correlated factors should
fall within its purview. However, nearly all of the lower courts that
applied or considered applying age proxy discrimination theory in
ADEA cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper rec-
ognized that there should be some limitation on an employer's ability
to consider age-correlated factors when making employment deci-
sions, and that at least in some circumstances, an employer's reliance
on an age-correlated factor could support a finding of intentional age
discrimination. In one fell swoop, however, the Supreme Court in Ha-
zen Paper displaced nearly twenty years of age proxy jurisprudence,
substantially narrowing the scope of the age proxy doctrine as it had
previously been interpreted and applied by the lower courts.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins," 2 the Supreme Court sought to clar-
ify the scope of the age proxy doctrine. Walter Biggins, a sixty-two-
year-old worker, claimed that he had been wrongfully discharged
from his position as technical director of a paper company in violation
of the ADEA, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)," 3 and state law. Biggins alleged that the defendants-
Hazen Paper Company and its owners and operators, Thomas and
Robert Hazen-terminated his employment in order to prevent his
pension benefits from vesting. The Hazen Paper Company pension
109 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.), rehg denied, 738 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1984).
110 Id. at 1186.
11 Id.
112 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
113 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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plan had a ten-year vesting period and had Biggins worked only "a few
more weeks," he would have qualified for pension benefits.114 The
defendants denied these allegations, maintaining that Biggins had
been fired for doing business with the company's competitors and for
his refusal to sign a confidentiality agreement.115
The case was tried in the District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts before a jury, which returned a verdict for Biggins on all
three claims. The court, however, granted the defendants' motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on both the state law claim and
the jury's finding that the defendants "willfully" violated the ADEA."
6
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit. The court of appeals upheld the district court's imposition of
liability under the ADEA, reversed the district court's ruling as to "will-
fulness," and reinstated the liquidated damages award.' 17 Concluding
that there was "sufficient evidence" for ajury to find that the defend-
ants intentionally fired Biggins because of his age, the court applied
age proxy discrimination theory:
Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could reasonably have
found that Thomas Hazen decided to fire Biggins before his pen-
sion rights vested and ... that age was inextricably intertwined with the
decision to fire Biggins. If it were not for Biggins' age, sixty-two, his
pension rights would not have been within a hairbreadth of vesting.
Biggins was fifty-two years old when he was hired; his pension rights
vested in ten years." 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether "an em-
ployer's interference with the vesting of pension benefits violate[s]
the ADEA."" 9 Seeking to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to
"whether an employer violates the ADEA by acting on the basis of a
factor, such as an employee's pension status or seniority, that is empir-
ically correlated with age,"120 the Supreme Court issued, what is, in
essence, an incomplete hornbook explanation of the age proxy
doctrine.
114 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 607.
115 Id. at 606.
116 Willful violations of the ADEA give rise to liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1994).
117 Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1412, 1415 (1st Cir. 1992).
118 Id. at 1412 (emphasis added).
119 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608. The Supreme Court also considered the applicability
of the Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), "willfulness" standard for
liquidated damages to informal employment decisions, as well as to formal, facially discrim-
inatory employment practices motivated by an employee's age. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at
608. The Court reaffirmed the Thurston "willfulness" standard and held that it applies to
all disparate treatment cases under the ADEA-formal policies and ad hoc, informal deci-
sions alike. Id. at 617.
120 507 U.S. at 608.
1996]
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Noting that disparate treatment discrimination theory is applica-
ble to ADEA claims, the Court commenced its analysis by specifying
the requirements for establishing liability for disparate treatment
discrimination:
In a disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the pro-
tected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the em-
ployer's decision. . . Whatever the -decisionmaking process, a
disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's
protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a deter-
minative influence on the outcome. 121
Relying on this analytical framework, the Court quickly condemned
the use of age as a proxy for an employee's ability or skills. Citing
EEOC v. Wyoming122 and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswel,123 the Court
observed that all employers must follow the ADEA's "commands": 24
"It is the very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to
be fired because the employer believes that productivity and compe-
tence decline with old age."125 An employer may not, the Court
noted, rely on an employee's age as a proxy for attributes such as pro-
ductivity or ability, but must instead focus on those factors directly.126
The Court, however, failed to reach the same conclusion when it con-
sidered the legal status of employment decisions based on age prox-
ies-factors linked to and correlated with age, but not directly age-
based.
Comparing White v. Westinghouse Electric Co.127 and Metz v. Transit
Mix, Inc.' 28 with Williams v. General Motors Corp.129 and EEOC v. Clay
Printing Co.,' 30 the Court "clarif[ied] that there is no disparate treat-
ment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is
some feature other than the employee's age.' 31 Noting that Congress's
enactment of the ADEA was prompted by a concern that older work-
ers were disadvantaged in the workplace due to "inaccurate and stig-
matizing stereotypes" 132 about their abilities, the Court stated that
when an employer's decision is "wholly motivated by factors other than age,
121 Id. at 610.
122 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
123 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
124 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610-11.
125 Id. at 610.
126 Id. at 611.
127 862 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
128 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987); see supra tekt accompanying notes 96-100.
129 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); see supra text accom-
panying notes 88-90.
130 955 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1992).
131 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (emphasis-added).
132 Id. at 610.
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the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears." 33
As a result of this analysis, the Court concluded that employers could
lawfilly differentiate among employees based on certain age-corre-
lated factors, such as an employee's pension status when vesting is
based on the employee's years of service. Finding an employee's age
to be "analytically distinct" from his or her years of service, the Court
reasoned:
A decision... to fire an older employee solely because he has nine-
plus years of service and therefore is "close to vesting" would not
constitute discriminatory treatment on the basis of age. The pro-
hibited stereotype ("Older employees are likely to be " )
would not have figured in this decision, and the attendant stigma
would not ensue. The decision would not be the result of an inac-
curate and denigrating generalization about age, but would rather
represent an accurate judgment about the employee-that he in-
deed is "close to vesting."' 34
The Hazen Paper Court stressed that it did not decide the "special
case" in which an employee's pension benefits are about to vest due to
the employee's age and the employer terminates the employee in or-
der to prevent the benefits from vesting.'3 5 A unanimous Court held
simply that an employer does not violate the ADEA "just by interfering
with an older employee's pension benefits that would have vested by
virtue of the employee's years of service," 13 6 rather than his age.' 3 7
'33 Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
'34 Id. at 612.
'35 Id. at 613.
136 Id.
137 Id. The Supreme Court did not, however, hold that an employer could lawfully
interfere with an employee's pension benefits. As the Court recognized, regardless of
whether pension eligibility was based on age or years of service, such conduct would be
actionable under ERISA. Id. at 612. The Hazen PaperCourt held simply that an employer's
interference with service-based benefits, "without more" would not constitute an ADEA
violation. Id
The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "to recon-
sider whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find an ADEA violation." Id. at 614.
Notwithstanding the Court's holding that evidence of pension interference alone could
not support the imposition of liability under the ADEA, on remand, a three-judge panel of
the court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the em-
ployer violated the ADEA. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., Nos. 91-1591, 91-1614, 1993 WL
406515, at *5 (1st Cir. Oct. 18, 1993).
Applying the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting formula, see infra discussion
part mA2.a, the panel held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate
treatment age discrimination and that disregarding any evidence of the employer's alleged
interference with the vesting of the plaintiff's pension rights, sufficient evidence existed for
a reasonable jury to disbelieve the reasons put forth by the defendants for their actions and
to believe that age discrimination was the real reason. Id. at *4. In addition to the evi-
dence of pension interference, the court noted that the plaintiff was asked to sign a confi-
dentiality agreement, even though no other employee was asked to do so, and that his
younger replacement was required to sign a less onerous agreement. Id. at *5. On the
defendants' petition for rehearing, the court of appeals en banc withdrew the panel's opin-
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The Court, however, failed to adequately identify what, if any, role the
age proxy doctrine should assume in disparate treatment discrimina-
tion cases following Hazen Paper.
B. The Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of the age proxy doctrine. Although the Court did "not pre-
clude the possibility that an employer who targets employees with a
particular pension status on the assumption that these employees are
likely to be older thereby engages in age discrimination," the Court
expressly rejected the view that an employer could violate the ADEA
when motivated by "some feature other than the employee's age."'3 8
ion and remanded the ADEA claim for a new trial, concluding that the "likelihood of
verdict contamination" regarding the ADEA claim was "sufficiently great that the interests
ofjustice require a full new trial on the age-discrimination claim." Biggins v. Hazen Paper
Co., 899 F. Supp. 809, 816 (D. Mass. 1995) (quoting Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., No. 91-
1591, 1994 WL 377800 (1st Cir. June 27, 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 614 (1994)) (on
remand, denying motions for summary judgment on the age discrimination claim).
138 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609, 612-13. There are at least three variants of age proxy
cases which are not expressly addressed by the Court's decision in Hazen Paper. first, the
"special case" that the Court expressly stated that it "did not decide," in which pension
vesting is based on age, rather than years of service; second, a mixed case, in which pension
eligibility is based on some combination of age and years of service; and third, cases involv-
ing age-correlated factors that fall outside the pension context, such as salary costs, retire-
ment eligibility, and seniority. At least one commentator has argued that when faced with
the "special case," the Court would find an ADEA violation. See Gregory, supra note 46, at
409; see also Babich v. Unisys Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (D. Kan. 1994) (observing that
Hazen Paper "left the door open" for ADEA claims based on an employer's interference
with an employee's entitlement to pension benefits as a result of the employee's age). But
see Heath v. Massey-Ferguson Parts Co., 869 F. Supp. 1379, 1394 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("The
mere fact of a perfect correlation between pension status and the protected age group is
insufficient" to raise "a genuine issue" of age discrimination under Hazen Paper.).
The Court explicitly sought to limit its holding in Hazen Paper to a particular set of
facts. The Court emphasized, "Our holding is simply that an employer does not violate the
ADEAjust by interfering with an older employee's pension benefits that would have vested
by virtue of the employee's years of service." Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613. Notwithstanding
the contextual limitations the Court sought to impose upon its holding, since the Court
purported to answer the question "whether an employer violates the ADEA by acting on
the basis of a factor ... that is empirically correlated with age," id. at 608, the Court's
holding logically extends to employment decisions based on a myriad of factors that are
empirically correlated with age but are not analytically indistinct from age. Following Ha-
zen Paper, numerous lower courts have so interpreted the Court's decision. See, e.g., Bialas
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1995) (evidence that employer termi-
nated older employees because of their higher salaries "does not in itself support an infer-
ence of age discrimination"); Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 152 (5th
Cir. 1995) (evidence that employer discharged employee because of high salary or retire-
ment eligibility cannot support ADEA claim); EEOC v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d
1418, 1420 (observing that under Hazen Paper, "[t]he fact that 'overquaification' might be
strongly correlated with advanced age does not make use of this criterion necessarily a
violation of the ADEA"); Allen v. Diebold, 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the ADEA "does not constrain an employer who acts on the basis of other factors-pension
status, seniority, wage rate-that are empirically correlated with age"); Woroski v. Nashua
Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 110 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he ADEA does not prohibit an employer
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Implicitly overruling Metz, the Court stated: "Pension status may be a
proxy for age, not in the sense that the ADEA makes the two factors
equivalent... , but in the sense that the employer may suppose a
correlation between the two factors and act accordingly." 3 9
In light of its decision in Hazen Paper, the Court would seem to
permit the application of the age proxy doctrine only when the non-
age factor upon which the employer relied in making an adverse em-
ployment decision correlated perfectly with age 140 or in scenarios
from acting out of concern for excessive costs, even if they arise from age-related facts-
such as... seniority.... ."); Gould v. Kempers Nat'l Insur. Cos., 880 F. Supp. 527, 532-33
(N.D. Ill. 1995) ("Years of service, seniority, and pension status may be legally considered
by employers in making business decisions, because such business decisions are not 'neces-
sarily age-based.'"); Adams v. Dupont Merck Pharmaceutical Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (interpreting Hazn Paperto hold that "seniority is not a proxy
for age" and that "terminating a highly salaried senior employee.., would not violate
[the] ADEA7).
139 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613.
14o As the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois explained in EEOC v.
Community Unit School District No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902, 904 (S.D. Ill. 1986), a factor'
perfectly correlated with age is so "inexorably linked with age" it cannot be viewed as a
separate factor. See also Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("when wage is 'directly dependant on' age, the use of one is
no better than the use of the other").
Since the Court expressly stated that it did "not consider the special case where an
employee is about to vest in pension benefits as a result of his age, . . . and the employer
fires the employee in order to prevent vesting," Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613 (citing 1 J.
MAmoRsKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW § 5.02[2] (1992)), Hazen Paper arguably should not
affect courts' application of age proxy theory to cases in which a non-age factor correlates
perfectly with age. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648
n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) ("perceiv[ing] no conflict between [Hazen Paper]" and the court's find-
ing that union's differential treatment of employees based on their retirement status vio-
lated the ADEA); EEOC v. California Micro Devices Corp., 869 F. Supp. 767 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment where the employer discharged an
employee because of the employee's intent to retire); see also Motzny v. Hilander Food
Stores, No. 94-1996, 1995 WL 16751, at *3 (7th Cir.Jan. 17, 1995) (fact that "an employee's
salary tends to increase with his or her age, making age and compensation highly corre-
lated.., does not make an employer's salary consideration improper unless wage depends
directly on age, such that the use of one is a pretext for the other"). But see Heath v.
Massey-Ferguson Parts Co., 869 F. Supp. 1379, 1394 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("The mere fact of a
perfect correlation between pension status and the protected age group is insufficient" to
raise "a genuine issue" of age discrimination under Hazen Paper.).
At least one lower court has held that Hazen Paper "vindicates" Judge Easterbrook's
dissent in Met. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir.
1994) (decisions based on salary considerations will not support an ADEA claim). Judge
Easterbrook had argued that "[w]age discrimination is age discrimination only when wage
depends directly on age, so that the use of one is a pretext for the other, high covariance is
not sufficient." Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1212 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting); see also EEOC v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1473 (D.NJ. 1993)
("Whatever force Metz may have had before has been undercut in Hazen Paper... .") (cita-
tions omitted). But see Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit lt, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 507, 508 ("Hazen
Paper... fails to resolve the ADEA cost problem because its narrow holding does not
preclude older workers harmed by their employer's ostensibly cost-based employment
practices from seeking relief under a disparate impact theory of liability.").
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such as the following: Suppose an employer believes that older work-
ers are less skilled, less intelligent, and less able. Knowing that the
ADEA prohibits discrimination in employment based on age, and that
only the company's oldest workers have qualified for a company pen-
sion, the employer decides to terminate all pension-eligible employ-
ees. Were all these facts (including the employer's hidden
motivation) to come out at trial, even the Hazen Paper Court would
find the employer's reliance on the employees' pension status to con-
stitute an impermissible age proxy in violation of the ADEA, for the
employer clearly "suppose [d] a correlation" between age and pension
eligibility and "act[ed] accordingly."14
1
This hypothetical illustrates how the Hazen Paper Court perceived
the role of the age proxy doctrine in proving claims of intentional age
discrimination. 42 The Court stated that if an employee protected by
the ADEA can prove that his or her employer used an age-correlated
factor, such as pension status, to mask a discriminatory animus, the
employer would be liable under the ADEA, notwithstanding the fact
that the employer did not overtly discriminate against the employee
on the basis of the employee's age. The Court would, however, re-
quire proof that the employer sought to do indirectly what he or she
could not do directly: differentiate among employees on the basis of
an age-correlated factor as a means of "getting at" age. 143
Although Hazen Paper did not explicitly sound the death knell for
the age proxy doctrine,'4 the Court's narrow application of the doc-
trine accords it little independent legal significance.145 The Hazen Pa-
per Court failed to recognize the evidentiary import of the age proxy
doctrine. An employer rarely waves a red flag announcing his or her
141 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613.
142 The Court in Hazen Papermade no mention of what if any role age proxy evidence
should assume in establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. Hazen Paper, 507
U.S. at 613. The Court simply stated that "inferring age-motivation... may be problematic
in cases where other unsavory motives, such as pension interference, [are] present." Id
But cf discussion infra part IIIA2.b.
143 Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1216 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) ("Intent means doing something because of, not in spite of, a particular conse-
quence.... That means using wage to get at age.") (citations omitted).
144 See supra notes 138, 140.
145 The age proxy doctrine has little independent legal significance after Hazen Paper
because if an employee could otherwise establish an employer's discriminatory intent
(whether by direct or indirect evidence of age discrimination), the employee would not
need to rely on the age proxy doctrine to prove his or her claims. Similarly, if an employee
could establish that his or her employer based the challenged employment decision on a
non-age factor that correlated perfectly with age or was analytically indistinct from age,
proof that the employer relied on such a factor would likely be deemed tantamount to
establishing that the employer based the employment decision on age itself. In other
words, evidence of an employer's reliance on such a factor when making employment deci-
sions would likely constitute circumstantial if not direct evidence of age discrimination,
irrespective of the age proxy doctrine.
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discriminatory intent.1 46 Since courts are not privy to an employer's
state of mind, they must rely on various forms of proof and evidentiary
devices to uncover that which is hidden from view.147
The Hazen Paper Court viewed the age proxy doctrine not as an
evidentiary tool for proving intentional age discrimination,1 48 but as
its conclusion. Once an employer's discriminatory motive has been
proven, the Court would not hesitate to label the. age-correlated factor
on which the challenged employment decision was based a disguised
"proxy" for age. The doctrine, as limited by the Court, does not, how-
ever, assist the employee in proving his or her claim of intentional age
discrimination under the ADEA. 149
III
ANALYSIS
If a statute were directed at roses, and a grower described its
flower as a fragrant multipetaled red bloom grown on a branch with
thorns, is the flower any less a rose?' 50
The ADEA protects older workers from being dismissed, passed
over for a promotion, or treated differently "because of' their
"age.' 51 Differential treatment based on retirement eligibility, pen-
sion status, or seniority is in many cases, nothing less than age discrim-
ination by another name.
The age proxy doctrine, in its purest form, recognizes that an
employer's discriminatory intent is rarely displayed for public view.152
As the Fifth Circuit has observed, "[d]iscrimination exists... 'in forms
as myriad as the creative perverseness of human beings can pro-
vide."" 53 In light of the difficulties employees face when attempting
to prove claims of disparate treatment discrimination under the
ADEA, the age proxy doctrine should be accorded a more prominent
146 See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
147 See discussion infra part IIA2.
148 Gregory, supra note 46, at 393.
149 See, e.g., Heath v. Massey-Ferguson Parts Co., 869 F. Supp. 1379, 1394 (E.D. Wis.
1994) ("To raise an issue for trial on proxy discrimination [under Hazen Paper, the em-
ployee] must create an issue of fact as to whether [the employer] deliberately used the
perfect correlation between its employees' pension status and their age as a shield to fire
the older employees because of their age. The mere fact of a perfect correlation between
pension status and the protected age group is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact
in this regard.").
150 Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 128 (3d Cir.) (SloviterJ., dissent-
ing), cert. denie4 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
151 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994).
152 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
153 Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Mc-




role in ADEA cases than the Court's narrow application of the doc-
trine in Hazen Paper allows.'5 The language of the ADEA, its pur-
poses, and the policy considerations underlying its enactment require
a broader application of the age proxy doctrine.155
A. Toward an Expansive Definition of the Age Proxy Doctrine:
Overcoming Problems of Proof
1. Unreasonable Factors Other Than Age
In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court overlooked the ADEA's "rea-
sonable factors other than age" (RFOA) exception. 156 The Court
stated that when making employment decisions, the ADEA requires
only that an employer ignore an employee's age; "it does not specify
further characteristics that an employer must also ignore."
157
The ADEA, however, does not permit employers to base employ-
ment decisions on "any factor other than age."158 The ADEA limits
the scope of its exception to "reasonable factors other than age,"
159 im-
plicitly recognizing that there are "unreasonable" factors besides age
which an employer may not use to differentiate among employees.
Through its RFOA exception, the ADEA thus incorporates the age
proxy doctrine. What little legislative history there is on the RFOA
exception supports this construction of the statute.
160
154 See infra part llI.A.2.b.ii.
155 See infra part M.A.2.b.i.
156 The ADEA's RFOA exception, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1994), permits employers to
differentiate among employees or job applicants "where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
157 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 612.
158 The ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age" exception arguably resembles the
Equal Pay Act's "any factor other than sex" exception. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (iv)
(1994) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
As the Supreme Court observed in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1982), the
ADEA's RFOA exception insures that employers are "permitted to use neutral criteria not
directly dependant on age when making employment decisions. Id. at 232-33 (emphasis ad-
ded). Several lower courts have, however, misinterpreted the ADEA's RFOA exception,
extending the exception to any "factor other than age" not simply "reasonable factors other
than age." See, e.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994)
(interpreting the RFOA exception to permit any employment decisions "made for reasons
independent of age but which happen to correlate with age").
'59 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
160 During the 1967 House debates on the ADEA, Representative Burton asked Secre-
tary Wirtz whether the ADEA's prohibitions would override a collective bargaining agree-
ment which contained references to seniority. The following exchange occurred:
Secretary Wirtz: ... If a seniority clause were so constructed or a retire-
ment clause were so constructed that it unfairly attached significance to
age, my answer would be "yes" to your question.
Mr. Burton: Who would judge that?
Secretary Wirtz: The Secretary of Labor.
Mr. Burton: By what standards?
Secretary Wirtz: By the standards of whether there is differentiation on
the basis of age which the facts do not warrant.
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Some age-related factors-such as retirement status or pension
eligibility, when an employee becomes pension-eligible only upon
reaching a certain age-may be so perfectly correlated with age that
they cannot reasonably be viewed as factors "other than age."' 61 Other
age-correlated factors, such as seniority, pension eligibility based on
years of service, and longevity, are not direct substitutes for age, but
are nevertheless sufficiently age-correlated that employment decisions
based on these factors could constitute the very stereotyped, group-
oriented, "arbitrary" discrimination that the ADEA was enacted to
combat.162 Although an employer may, consistent with ADEA, base
employment decisions on "reasonable factors other than age," 163 an
employer cannot lawfully defend his or her actions on the basis of
such "unreasonable" factors, notwithstanding that these age-corre-
lated factors are technically "factors other than age."
Disparate treatment analysis supplemented by an expansive appli-
cation of the age proxy doctrine "captures the essence of what Con-
gress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.' 6 4 A non-age factor can readily
correlate in an employer's mind with age.' 65 The age proxy doctrine
is simply a means of getting at that unexpressed motivation. An ex-
pansive application of the age proxy doctrine is therefore necessary to
counteract the difficulties employees face when trying to prove a case
of intentional age discrimination.
2. Difficulties in Proving Age Discrimination
The threshold question in every ADEA disparate treatment dis-
crimination case is whether the defendant employer was motivated by
the plaintiff's age. 166 An employee may prove his or her case by pro-
ducing direct or circumstantial evidence of the employer's discrimina-
tory intent. Direct evidence sufficient to sustain an ADEA claim
67
Age Discrimination in Employment Hearings Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967).
161 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
162 Id. § 621; see supra note 38.
163 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
164 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
165 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes
and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 172-73 (1992) (observing that legal suppression of
discrimination based on "proxies" such as age, sex, and race "will likely stimulate the inven-
tion and use of more ingenious proxies that correlate highly with the forbidden proxies").
166 See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
167 There is some disagreement as to what constitutes direct evidence of discrimina-
tion in the employment discrimination context. Some courts are willing to consider as
direct evidence any evidence that tends to establish a prejudicial or stereotyped view of the
protected class of which the plaintiff is a member. Other courts require that such evidence
be tied to the decisionmaking processes involved in the challenged action. SeeAnn C. Mc-
Ginley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of SummaryJudgment in Title
Vl and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L REv. 203, 213-14 n.37 (1993).
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may include evidence of age classifications, actions or statements by
employers that reflect stereotyped perceptions about the abilities of
older workers, or comments made by individuals directly involved in
an organization's employment decisions that demonstrate a discrimi-
natory attitude or animus.' 68 However, in today's litigious environ-
ment "smoking gun" evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent
is rarely present.' 69 As the Supreme Court recognized in United States
168 The elements of proof in a direct evidence or "pure discrimination" case are no
different from those in any other case. See, e.g., Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d
893, 897 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cet. denied, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987). If a plaintiff succeeds in
proving a prima facie case of intentional age discrimination, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the defendant to prove that one of the statutorily defined exceptions to the ADEA
apply. An employer can take any action otherwise prohibited under the ADEA where: (1)
age is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business"; (2) "the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age"; (3) the employment practices at issue involve "an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country, and compliance with [the ADEA] would cause such employer.., to vio-
late the laws of the country in which such workplace is located," 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1)
(1994); (4) the contested action is necessary "to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority
system that is not intended to evade the purposes of [the ADEA]," id. § 623(f) (2) (A); (5)
the contested action is necessary "to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit
plan," id. § 623(f) (2) (B); or (6) the action was taken "to discharge or otherwise discipline
an individual for good cause," id. § 623(f) (3).
A claim of disparate treatment discrimination based on direct evidence of age discrim-
ination may also be analyzed as a "mixed motive" case. "Mixed motive" analysis was first
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), a
Tide VII case. In 1991, Congress expressly codified mixed motive analysis under Title VII.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 706(g) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Courts have since
applied "mixed motive" analysis to age discrimination cases. See, e.g., Visser v. Packer Engi-
neering Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991). Since employment decisions typi-
cally involve a multitude of factors, virtually every direct evidence age discrimination case
could conceivably be argued as a mixed motive case. See 2 EGLrr, supra note 16, § 7.42. At
least one commentator has suggested that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine model, which
shifts the burden of production, but not the burden of proof to the defendant, may ulti-
mately be "undercut" by mixed motive analysis, which shifts both burdens to the defen-
dant. See id.
A third method of establishing intentional age discrimination is "pattern or practice"
or systemic discrimination analysis. Under the ADEA, however, such cases are extremely
rare. For a discussion of ADEA "pattern or practice" cases, see 2 id. § 7.36. Several courts
have also recognized claims of age discrimination due to the existence of a hostile work
environment. See, e.g., Clemmer v. Enron Corp., Civ. A. No. H-93-3550, 1995 WL 334372
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 1995) (citing cases).
169 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois explained the infrequency
with which one finds direct evidence of age discrimination as follows:
It is a rare case.., when a plaintiff can produce the "smoking gun" that
proves age discrimination by direct evidence. Few employers write memos,
for example, which state that a particular individual was fired or not hired
because he or she was "too old." For that reason, plaintiffs are usually
forced to prove age discrimination through indirect evidence, which calls
into play a variation of the burden-shifting analysis used to resolve Title VII
cases.
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 61 USLW 2618, 1993 WL 106523, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
24, 1993), aft'd, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995). "Employ-
ers have become increasingly adept at protecting themselves from discrimination lawsuits."
McGinley, supra note 167, at 215 n.45 (citation omitted).
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Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,170 "[tihere will seldom be
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." 171 Most
plaintiffs must, therefore, attempt to prove an ADEA violation by
means of indirect or circumstantial evidence of age discrimination. 172
a. The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine Burden-Shifting Formula
In disparate treatment discrimination cases, courts have regularly
applied Title VII case law to the ADEA, adopting the burden-shifting
formula set out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green'73 and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine74 to enable ADEA plaintiffs to establish
intentional age discrimination despite the absence of any direct evi-
dence of an employer's discriminatory intent. 175 The McDonnell Doug-
las/Burdine framework176 is not a strict model, but simply a guide,
allocating burdens of production and establishing an order for the
170 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
171 Id. at 716; see also Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir.)
("[W]e do not require direct proof of age discrimination because... age discrimination,
like other forms of discrimination, is often subtle ..... 'Even an employer who knowingly
discriminates on the basis of age may leave no written records revealing the forbidden
motive and may communicate it orally to no one.'") (quoting LaMontague v. American
Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984)), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052
(1987); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985)
("Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimination is as
difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree.").
172 A plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination through
circumstantial evidence is not required to fill the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prescription.
Circumstantial statistical evidence or circumstantial evidence of employer subterfuge could
also be used to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination independent of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas/Burdine model. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 131
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 943 (1982); see also 2 EGtrr, supra note 16, § 7.35
(discussing the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of age discrim-
ination in a non-McDonnell Douglas/Burdine configuration).
173 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
174 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
175 Recognizing that in most cases, direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory
intent will be "unavailable or difficult to acquire," the Supreme Court "articulated a
method of proof that relies on presumptions and shifing burdens of production" now
known as the McDonnell.Douglas/Burdine formula. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d
893, 897 (3d Cir.) (quoting Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. dis-
missed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987)).
176 In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), a
unanimous Supreme Court clarified the allocation of burdens of proof in the burden-
shifting formula originally set out in McDonnell Douglas. Burdine held that the employer
need only produce evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for his or her
actions; the employer need not persuade the factfinder that he or she was actually moti-
vated by the asserted reasons. Id. at 255.
For a discussion of the evolution of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework under
Tide VII, see Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High
Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEiP. L. REv.
385 (1994).
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presentation of proof.' 77 Courts have therefore adapted the McDon-
nell Douglas/Burdine formula to fit ADEA cases.
As adapted, an ADEA plaintiff must first establish, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, a prima facie case of intentional age discrimi-
nation. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a
plaintiff must present "evidence from which an intent to discriminate
[on the basis of age] can be inferred."'178 The plaintiff must establish
that he or she was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified
for the position at issue; (3) adversely affected by the defendant's em-
ployment decision; and (4) replaced by a person sufficiently younger
to permit an inference of age discrimination. 179
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, 180 the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine model creates a presumption of intentional
discrimination.' 81 The burden of production then shifts to the defen-
dant, who need only articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" ex-
planation for the employment action in order to overcome this
177 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-77 (1978) (The McDonnell Doug-
las test was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on
the critical question of discrimination.").
178 SeeGinwrightv. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 457, 756 F. Supp. 1458, 1475 (D. Kan. 1991);
Mull v. Arco Durethene Plastics, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 158, 162 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd, 784
F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1986).
179 See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996).
In "reduction-in-force" cases, in which an employee's discharge results from a general
reduction in the employer's workforce due to unfavorable economic conditions, the fourth
element may be satisfied by showing "that there was some ... evidence indicating that the
employer did not treat age neutrally in deciding to dismiss the plaintiff." EEOC v. Western
Elec. Co., Inc., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (In reduction-in-force cases, "the plaintiff [must] show
through circumstantial, statistical, or direct evidence that the discharge occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.").
180 The plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination is in
and of itself not "onerous." It requires only the production of evidence which "'suggests'
that the employment decision was based on age." Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,
1420 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir.
1985)).
181 As the Court stated in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),
the prima facie case raises an inference of "discriminatory animus because experience has
proved that in the absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not that those
actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations." Id. at 580. The Court explained:
[We are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experi-
ence that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary man-
ner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus,
when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated
as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, whom we generally assume acts with some reason, based his deci-




presumption of discrimination. 8 2 The employer "need not persuade
the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." 18 3
The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.
Once the employer has met his or her burden of production, the
employee then has the opportunity to show that the employer's prof-
fered justification for the alleged discriminatory practice is not the
true reason for the employer's decision but merely a pretext for dis-
crimination.' 8 4 Prior to the Court's decision in St. Mayy's Honor Center
v. Hicks,185 an ADEA plaintiff could, in many jurisdictions, establish
pretext simply by "show[ing] that the employer's proffered evidence
[was] unworthy of credence." 86 So long as the plaintiff disproved the
defendant's proffered explanation for the alleged discriminatory ac-
tion, the plaintiff could prevail. 187 In Hicks, however, a 5-4 majority of
the Supreme Court "upped" the evidentiary "ante" for the plaintiff.'88
Hicks held that to establish pretext, an employee must prove "both that
the [employer's] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real
reason.'u8 9 It is no longer enough, in other words, for the factfinder
to simply "disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plain-
tiffs explanation of intentional discrimination." 190 After Hicks, even if
the plaintiff proved that the employer's proffered explanation for his
or her actions was not credible, such a showing would not entitle the
plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law; it would only permit the
factfinder "to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." 191
Although courts and commentators disagree as to the extent to
which Hicks increased the plaintiff's burden, most concede that Hicks
makes proving disparate treatment discrimination more difficult for
plaintiffs. 192 In assessing the impact of the majority's decision, Justice
182 In articulating a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for his or her actions,
"'[t] he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,'
reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier offad, would support a finding that unlaw-
ful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
183 Burdine 450 U.S. at 254.
184 Id. at 256.
185 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
186 Burdine 450 U.S. at 256.
187 See infra note 192.
188 2 EGLT, supra note 16, § 7.05, at 7-36; Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lis, and Ideology: The
Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. Rxv. 939, 943 (1995).
189 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine 450 U.S. at 253).
190 Id. at 2754.
191 Id. at 2749.
192 See, e.g., Brookins, supra note 188, at 943 ("[T]he Court is selecting evidentiary
rules that once were swords for victims of discrimination, melting those rules, and re-
forging them into shields for employers."); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Dispa-
rate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2232 (1995); Eileen Kaufman, Employment
Discrimination: Recent Developments in the Supreme Court, 10 TOURO L. REv. 525, 535 (1994)
19961
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Souter stated in his dissent that the Hicks majority "saddle [s] the vic-
tims of discrimination with the burden of either producing direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent or eliminating the entire universe of
possible nondiscriminatory reasons for a personnel decision."193
Moreover, the decision creates a greater incentive for employers to
fabricate nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions.194
The impact of Hicks is amplified by courts' increasing willingness
to grant employers' motions for summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases. 195 Once reluctant to use the summary judgment
(noting that "[e]mployment discrimination claimants who cannot prove their case by di-
rect evidence are bound to have a much more difficult time" after Hicks); Joe K. Windle,
Comment, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is the Supreme Court's Definition of Pretext Benefi-
cial or Detrimental to Title VH Plaintiffs?, 18 AM.J. TRIAi. ADvoc. 213, 222 (1994) (observing
that Hicks has probably increased the plaintiff's burden of proving employment discrimi-
nation at trial). But see Norma G. Whitis, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Title
VII Shifting Burden Stays Put, 25 Loy. U. Cm. LJ. 269 (1994) (arguing that Hicks merely
clarifies the framework under which a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination and
that it does not make proving Title VII claims more difficult for plaintiffs).
Prior to Hicks, in evaluating whether an employer's proffered explanation for his or
her actions was simply a pretext for discrimination, some courts applied a "pretext-only"
rule, under which a plaintiff need only disprove the employer's reasons for the challenged
action to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Other courts applied a "pretext plus"
rule, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the employer intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff in order to prevail. See EGLIr, supra note 16, § 7.29 (citing cases). "Pretext-
plus"jurisdictions thus placed a much higher burden of proof on plaintiffs than did "pre-
text-only" jurisdictions. Most commentators agree that Hicks falls somewhere in between.
See, e.g., Joseph R. Shannon, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden of Proof After
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 963, 988 (1994) (describing
reactions to Hicks); Whitis, supra at 291 (maintaining that Hicks adopted a "hybrid ap-
proach," which permits but does not require a finding of discrimination upon the plain-
tiff's disproof of the employer's proffered reasons for the action in question).
193 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
194 See, e.g., id at 2763-64 (SouterJ., dissenting) (The "majority's scheme... leads to
the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory reasons for their
own decisions to hire and fire employees, not only will benefit from lying but must lie."
Moreover, the majority's interpretation favors employers "by exempting them from respon-
sibility for lies."); Donna G. Goldian, Note, New Reason to Lie: The End of ProvingDiscrimina-
toy Intent Proving By Pretext Only After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 30 WiuL~mr-rE I
REv. 699, 719 (1994) (The "majority has gone to great lengths to protect employer defend-
ants who.., have advanced explanations that lack credulity."). Under the McDonnellDoug-
las/Burdine model, once an employee establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination, a
presumption of discrimination arises. Unless the employer articulates a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the challenged employment decision to rebut the employee's prima
facie case, the employee prevails as a matter of law. Under Hicks, an employer has a
greater incentive to proffer some nondiscriminatory reason for its action even if no such
reason in fact existed. The factfinder may not believe the employer, but if the employer
has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the factfinder is not
compelled to find for the employee unless it finds both that the employer's proffered
reason was pretextual and that it was a pretext for discrimination.
195 A "trilogy" of summary judgment cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1986-
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)-
changed the way courts approach summary judgment, making it much easier for defend-
ants to obtain summaryjudgment and depriving many deserving ADEA plaintiffs of their
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device in civil rights cases, which involve complex issues of intent, mo-
tive, and credibility,196 courts now frequently decide disparate treat-
ment age discrimination cases at the summary judgment stage. 197
Although some commentators have claimed that Hicks provides plain-
tiffs with the "ammunition" for surviving a summary judgment mo-
tion,198 most acknowledge that following Hicks, a plaintiff will
ultimately have greater difficulty surviving a defendant's motion for
sumnary judgment. 99
right to a jury trial. See McGinley, supra note 167, at 228-42; see also Brookins, supra note
188, at 957; ThomasJ. Piskorski, The GrowingJudicial Acceptance of SummaryJudgment in Age
Discrimination Cases, 18 EMPLOYEE REL LJ. 245, 254 (1992).
196 See Frank J. Cavaliere, The Recent "Respectability" of Summary Judgments and Directed
Verdicts in Intentional Age Discrimination Cases: ADEA Case Analysis Through the Supreme Court's
SummaryJudgment "Prism", 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 103, 118 (1993) (discussing standards for
granting summary judgment and directed verdict motions as applied in ADEA cases, not-
ing that in most situations, the employer has "an advantage in the summary judgment
contest"); see also Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE LJ. 73, 76-79 (1990) (outlining the history of summary judgment).
197 See 2 Ecur, supra note 16, § 7.55, at 7-338.
198 Essary, supra note 176, at 393 ("[T]he majority opinion actually provides 'ammuni-
tion' for many plaintiffs to withstand a summaryjudgment motion... [but] [i]f the lower
courts fails to rely on the 'ammunition' ... and instead routinely base employer summary
judgments on St. Mary's, the decision may be seen by employers as 'carte blanche' to per-
petuate subtle, hidden discrimination ....").
The "ammunition" to which Essary and other commentators refer is the following
statement by Justice Scalia:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (par-
ticularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, to-
gether with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimina-
tion, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that upon such
rejection, "[n]o additional proof of age discrimination is required."
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (citations omitted). But see Windle, supra note 192, at 223-28
(arguing that while some courts "have interpreted Hicks as placing a heavy burden on a
plaintiff seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment," Hicks may in fact "prove
beneficial to plaintiffs, at least at the summary judgment stage").
199 See, e.g., Goldian, supra note 194, at 718-19 (After Hicks it is "doubtful that many
plaintiffs (except perhaps the uncommonly fortuitous plaintiff who has direct evidence of
discrimination on an illegal basis) will be able to ... withstand a motion for summary
judgment."). Many commentators have suggested that even before Hicks, employers had
an advantage in the summary judgment "contest." See, e.g., Cavaliere, supra note 196, at
118; McGinley, supra note 167, at 208 (attributing the rise in successful employer motions
for summaryjudgment to a misreading of the 1986 "trilogy" of Supreme Court cases deal-
ing with the summary judgment device).
In ADEA cases, motions for summary judgment are typically raised either following
the plaintiff's initial presentation of evidence, with the defendant employer asserting that
the plaintiff failed to establish an element of the prima facie case of intentional age dis-
crimination, or, as is more commonly the case, after the defendant presents a nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the challenged action, claiming that there is "no genuine issue of
material fact" as to the pretextuality of the defendant's profferedjustification. To survive a
motion for sunmary judgment, an ADEA claimant need establish that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.
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The Court originally devised the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
framework to "compensate for the fact that direct evidence of inten-
tional discrimination is hard to come by."20 0 However, as modified by
Hicks, plaintiffs in mostjurisdictions will find it more difficult to prove
an ADEA violation by means of this burden-shifting formula, particu-
larly in light of the judiciary's growing acceptance of summary judg-
ment in ADEA cases. Broad application of the age proxy doctrine is
therefore necessary to counteract the difficulties ADEA plaintiffs face
when trying to establish an employer's discriminatory intent. Employ-
ers should be held accountable not only for age-based employment
decisions but also for employment decisions based on age-correlated
factors, in which a discriminatory motive can be easily disguised.20
The difficulty lies in formulating the definitional boundaries of the
age proxy doctrine so that the doctrine adequately protects the legiti-
mate interests served by the ADEA without unduly hindering employ-
ers' business autonomy.
b. The Proper Scope of the Age Proxy Doctrine
i. Furthering the Purposes of the ADEA
Delineating the proper scope of the age proxy doctrine and de-
fining which factors should qualify as age proxies is difficult. The rela-
tionship between age and age-correlated factors such as pension
eligibility, salary, and seniority often varies from organization to or-
ganization.20 2 But simply because a proper definition of the age
proxy doctrine may require case-by-case analysis to determine its ap-
plicability does not mean courts should hesitate to hold employers
accountable for intentional age discrimination achieved through con-
sideration of age-correlated factors.203 Although age proxy status
should not be limited to those factors which correlate perfectly with
age or are analytically indistinct from age-which even decisions fol-
lowing Hazen Paper have allowed 204 -age proxy status should not be
extended to every factor which might have a tenuous connection to
age, nor even to those factors which on the whole, tend to correlate
positively with age.
200 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
201 See supra text accompanying note 162. For instance, the age proxy doctrine implic-
ity recognizes that an employer who discharges his or her most senior employees is in
most cases "motivated not by years of service, but rather by a 'disguised reliance on age.'"
Louis Maslow II, Comment, Dual Liability: The Growing Overlap of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 58 ALB. L. REV.
509, 512 (1994).
202 O'MEvAR, supra note 15, at 122.
203 See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985) ("Congress ex-
pressly decided that problems involving age discrimination in employment should be re-
solved on a 'case-by case basis' ......
204 See supra note 140.
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In an attempt to justify the Court's narrow application of the age
proxy doctrine in Hazen Paper, at least one lower court has reasoned
that, unlike the laws and social policy of many European nations, the
ADEA was not intended to protect older workers from "the often
harsh economic realities of common business decisions and the hard-
ships associated with corporate reorganizations, downsizing, plant
closings and relocations."20 5 However, the ADEA was enacted not
only to prohibit age discrimination but to help change attitudes about
the capabilities of older workers. As expressed in the Act's preamble,
when Congress addressed the social problem of age discrimination in
employment it did so because "older workers f[ound] themselves dis-
advantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and . .. to regain
employment when displaced fromjobs";20 6 because "certain otherwise
desirable practices [worked] to the disadvantage of older persons";20 7
and because the "incidence of unemployment, [was], relative to the
younger ages, high among older workers."208
The ADEA strikes a certain balance between employer autonomy
and the protection of older workers. As the Seventh Circuit has
noted:
[A]Ithough the ADEA does not hand federal courts a roving com-
mission to review business judgments, the ADEA does create a cause
of action against business decisions that merge with age discrimina-
tion. Congress enacted the ADEA precisely because many employ-
ers or younger business executives act as if they believe that there
are good business reasons for discriminating against older employ-
ees. Retention of senior employees who can be replaced by younger, lower
paid persons frequently competes with other values, such as profits or concep-
tions of economic efficiency. The ADEA represents a choice among these val-
ues. It stands for the proposition that this is a better country for its
willingness to pay the costs for treating older employees fairly.20 9
205 Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994). Other courts have at-
tempted to rationalize certain types of age discriminatory practices on the ground that
older workers, on the whole, tend to benefit from institutional discrimination and employ-
ment policies rewarding seniority. As one court has noted, the strong correlation between
seniority and age means that the ADEA's protected class typically benefits from compensa-
tion, promotion, and employee benefits programs that reward seniority. Finnegan v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, "1162 (7th Cir. 1992). The force of such arguments
should, however, be questioned in light of the ADEA's purposes and the difficulties older
workers face as they attempt to remain employed, difficulties that prompted Congress's
enactment of the ADEA. See discussion supra part IA.
206 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1)-(3) (1994).
207 Id. § 621 (a) (2).
208 Id. § 621 (a) (3).
209 Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 21 n.8 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis
added), quoted in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1210 (7th Cir. 1987).
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The age proxy doctrine recognizes that the "inaccurate and deni-
grating generalization [s] about age,"210 which the ADEA was designed
to combat, are no less "stigmatizing" when cloaked in a clever dis-
guise. Age-based stereotypes and biases should not be perpetuated by
permitting employers to rely on age proxies when making employ-
ment decisions as a substitute for explicit age-based discrimination.
211
The age proxy doctrine should thus encompass those factors that
are closely related to, directly correlated with, and dependent upon
age. Age proxy status must, however, be limited to factors that are
time-based, such as seniority, years of service, retirement status, pen-
sion eligibility, and longevity. Application of this standard will often
require a case-by-case determination as to whether a factor qualifies as
a "proxy" for age. For example, if an employer bases salary increases
solely on job performance and skill, differential treatment on the basis
of salary costs would not implicate the age proxy doctrine. If, on the
other hand, an employer determines salary according to time-based,
age-correlated factors, such as years of service or seniority, and uses
salary costs as a means of eliminating higher-paid, older workers
within the protected group, salary would qualify as a "proxy" for age
under the formulation of the age proxy doctrine this Note
proposes.212
As the language of the ADEA makes clear, Congress did not in-
tend to provide a general remedy for the unemployment of older
workers. Congress was concerned about the unemployment which re-
sulted from employers' acting on inaccurate stereotypes about older
workers' abilities and productivity and discriminating against older
workers "because of [their] age."213 In the ADEA, Congress did not
proscribe only "age-based" employment decisions-employment deci-
sions in which an employee's age is a determinative factor-it sought
to prohibit employers from arbitrarily "discriminat[ing] against any
individual .. . because of such individual's age."214 Congress did not,
however, specify what constitutes "arbitrary discrimination"215 "be-
cause of... age."216
210 Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993).
211 See infra note 218.
212 Were an employer to base salary on both merit and an age-correlated criterion
such as seniority, salary should qualify as an age proxy only if the age-correlated criterion
constituted a determinative factor in the employer's decision, such that if the employee's
seniority was not considered, the employer would have decided differently. See supra text
accompanying note 46.
213 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). Congress's purpose in enacting the ADEA is explicitly set
forth in the Act's preamble. See text accompanying supra note 35.
214 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1994) (emphasis added).
215 Id. § 621(b). See supra note 38.
216 Id. § 623(a)(1).
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The age proxy doctrine fills the gap between "age-based" employ-
ment decisions and permissible forms of differentiation among em-
ployees based on "reasonable factors other than age."2 1 7 By requiring
employers to justify all employment decisions in which a time-based
factor is determinative, the age proxy doctrine holds employers ac-
countable for arbitrary age discrimination accomplished not only
through age-based factors, but age-correlated ones as well.2 1 8
ii. The Legal Significance of Age Proxy Evidence
In delineating the proper scope of the age proxy doctrine, one
must consider not only what factors should be recognized as age
"proxies" but, perhaps more importantly, the legal significance ac-
corded age proxy evid6nce. The proper scope of the age proxy doc-
trine depends in part upon its role in the proof process. Prior to
Hazen Paper, the lower courts permitted the introduction of age proxy
evidence in disparate treatment cases as direct evidence of age dis-
crimination,2 1 9 as circumstantial evidence of age discrimination in-
dependent of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine paradigm,220 and as a
means satisfying the evidentiary requirements of the McDonnell Doug-
las/Burdine burden-shifting model.22 1
This Note proposes that when an "age proxy"22 2 is "a determina-
tive factor" in an employer's decision, the decision should be treated
217 Id. § 623(f)(1). See discussion supra part M.A.1.
218 As one commentator has noted:
The practical reality is that certain characteristics, such as experience,
wages based on seniority, pension status, and benefit plans, do correlate
strongly with age and can be effectively used as proxies for age-based deter-
minations. If this does not violate the ADEA, then employers will have a
facially valid method for affecting limited "unintentional" age discrimina-
tion in their employment practices. This may result in a situation where
age discrimination in employment is prohibited in form, but not in
substance.
Pontz, supra note 36, at 321.
219 See, e.g., EEOC v. Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902, 904 (S.D. Ill.
1986) (evidence of employer's reliance on employees' intent to retire in reclassifying em-
ployees constitutes direct evidence of age discrimination).
220 See, e.g., Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1983) (suggesting
that evidence "that tended to show" that an employer demoted a more senior and, hence,
older worker to "save money" could constitute "direct proof of age discrimination"); see also
Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1991) (addressing the
use of age proxies as "circumstantial evidence" of age discrimination).
221 Courts have permitted employees to use age proxy evidence to establish the fourth
element of the prima facie case and to establish that the employer's proffered "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory" justification for his or her actions is simply a pretext for unlawful dis-
crimination. See, e.g., White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir.'1988)
(holding that age proxy evidence could be used to establish the pretextuality of the em-
ployer's proffered explanation for his alleged discriminatory actions).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 203-12 (discussing those factors that should be
accorded age proxy status under the formulation of the age proxy doctrine this Note
proposes).
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as the statutory equivalent of an age-based decision, triggering em-
ployer liability under the ADEA. Evidence of an employer's use of an
age proxy when making an employment decision, be it direct or cir-
cumstantial,223 would then be accorded the legal significance of com-
parable evidence of age-based employment discrimination. For
example, evidence of employment classifications based on an age
proxy or of actions or statements made by the employer that reflect an
intent to differentiate among employees on the basis of the age proxy
would constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. 224 The bur-
den of persuasion would then shift to the defendant employer to
prove that one of the statutorily defined exceptions to the ADEA
applies.
B. Effecting an Appropriate Balance of Employer and Employee
Interests
Most courts and commentators recognize that disparate treat-
ment discrimination theory alone is insufficient to encompass all the
forms of "arbitrary" age discrimination that Congress sought to pro-
scribe by enacting the ADEA. Those courts and commentators that
favor a narrow definition of the age proxy doctrine thus frequently
rely on disparate impact discrimination theory to reach the arbitrary
age discrimination that results when employers use age-related factors
to differentiate among employees. 225 Disparate impact discrimination
theory should not, however, be applied in ADEA cases. Application of
the age proxy doctrine as herein defined would effect a more appro-
priate balancing of employer and employee interests than would the
application of disparate impact discrimination theory to claims
brought under the ADEA.
1. Disparate Impact Discrimination Theory
Disparate impact discrimination involves employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
which disproportionately affect members of a protected group. The
reasoning behind disparate impact theory is that if an employment
223 See supra note 167.
224 If, on the other hand, an employee chose to rely on the McDonnellDouglas/Burdine!
Hicks model to establish unlawful age discrimination by his or her employer, age proxy
evidence could be used to establish the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case or the
pretextuality of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged ac-
tion. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., SuLLwvAN ET. AL, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 11.4, at 723 (1980) ("[Mlaximum effectuation" of ADEA principles requires acceptance
of both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of age discriminations); Greg-
ory, supra note 46, at 404 ("To treat an employer's reliance on a neutral factor as a direct
proxy for age is to trump the standards that exist for disparate impact claims.").
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practice disproportionately affects members of a protected group, the
employer should be required to justify the practice.226 Disparate im-
pact theory was developed in the Title VII context to identify situa-
tions in which companies, through inertia or insensitivity, maintained
employment practices which, although not intentionally discrimina-
tory, disproportionately disadvantaged members of a protected
group.2 27
The Supreme Court first adopted disparate impact theory in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2 2 8 striking down, as violative of Title VII, an
employer's education and testing requirement which had the effect of
disqualifying black applicants at a substantially higher rate than it did
white applicants.2 29 Citing Congress's desire to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and to remove "artificial, arbitrary and un-
necessary barriers to employment" through its enactment of Title VII,
the Court interpreted the language of Title VII to prohibit employ-
ment practices that are "fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion."230 The Court reasoned that employment practices "neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices." 231 Because the education and testing require-
ment proved to be unrelated to job performance, 232 and hence
unlawfully discriminated among employees on the basis of race, the
Court found that the practice violated Title VII.
233
In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court reminded the lower courts
that it has not yet decided whether disparate impact theory applies to
ADEA claims.23 4 The Court maintained, however, that disparate treat-
ment discrimination "captures the essence of what Congress sought to
prohibit in the ADEA." 235 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, underscored
226 Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992).
227 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
228 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
229 Id. at 427-29. The employer required a high school diploma or a passing grade on
an intelligence test as a condition of employment or transfer into one of the plant's higher
paying "operating departments." Id.
230 Id. at 431.
231 Id. at 430.
232 Id. at 431-32.
233 Id. at 436.
234 Citing Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945 (1981)
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting), the Court emphasized "we have never decided whether a dispa-
rate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA, and we need not do so here.
Respondent claims only that he received disparate treatment." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,




this statement, stressing that "there are substantial arguments that it is
improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the
ADEA." 236
Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether dispa-
rate impact discrimination is cognizable under the ADEA, many lower
courts, prior to Hazen Paper, did not hesitate to extend the doctrine to
alleged ADEA violations.28 7 The Second Circuit was the first to apply
236 Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., with whom Rehnquist, CJ., and Thomas, J., join, concur-
ring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence states in relevant part:
[N]othing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the
ADEA context the so-called "disparate impact" theory of Title VII .... As
the Court acknowledges . . .we have not yet addressed the question
whether such a claim is cognizable under the ADEA, and there are substan-
tial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis
from Title VII to the ADEA .... It is on the understanding that the Court
does not reach this issue that I join in its opinion.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (asserting that disparate impact discrimination theory
is "inconsistent with the express provisions of the ADEA and is not supported by any prior
decision of [the] Court"); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1216-20 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (maintaining that there is no support for disparate impact
theory in the text, legislative history, or purposes of the ADEA).
237 See e.g., First Circuit: Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 86 (1st Cir. 1986); Second
Circuit: Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 945 (1981);
Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992); Third Circuit: Massarsky v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983);
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 868 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
944 (1989); Sixth Circuit: Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990);
Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991); Eighth Circuit: Leftwich v.
Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Ninth Circuit: Rose v. Wells Fargo
& Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990); Shutt v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 934
F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1991), amended and superseded, 944 F.29 1431, cert. denied, 503 U.S.
937 (1992); Eleventh Circuit MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 770-71
(l1th Cir. 1991); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir.
1982).
Cf. Fifth Circuit: Akins v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir.
1984) (declining to decide whether disparate impact theory is available in ADEA cases);
Seventh Circuit: Davidson v. Board of Gov. of State Colleges & Univ., 920 F.2d 441, 444 (7th
Cir. 1990) (observing that "this court, except for a possibly off-hand dictum in Monroe v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 404 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004
(1985) has merely assumed that [disparate impact analysis applies under the ADEA]");
Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992) (clarifying
that the Seventh Circuit only assumes the applicability of disparate impact theory under
the ADEA); Tenth Circuit: Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir.
1993) ("The Tenth Circuit has never directly addressed whether a disparate impact claim is
cognizable under the ADEA... [W] e believe the prudent course is to merely assume the
applicability of the disparate impact analysis without deciding whether it is a viable theory
of recovery under the ADEA."); D.C. Circuit: Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d
994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989) (declining to decide whether
disparate impact analysis is applicable to ADEA cases).
The EEOC also maintains the view that traditional disparate impact theory is applica-
ble to claims brought under the ADEA. Section 1625.7(d) of the EEOC's interpretative
guidelines provides:
[Vol. 81:530
1996] NOTE-A GE PROXY DOCTRTNE
disparate impact analysis to the ADEA in Geller v. Markham.238 Geller
involved a fifty-five-year-old teacher's challenge of a Connecticut
school board's "sixth step policy."239 To cut costs, the school board
sought to hire teachers below a certain experience level, effectively
excluding 92.6% of teachers within the protected age group and 62%
of teachers under age 40.240 The court held that the school board's
policy violated the ADEA on both disparate treatment and disparate
impact grounds.2 41 Reasoning that disparate impact discrimination
theory should be applied in age discrimination cases, the court relied
principally on the textual similarity between ADEA and Title VII
prohibitions and on the Supreme Court's statement in Lorillard v.
Pons242 that "the [substantive] provisions of the ADEA were derived in
haec verba from Title VII."
243
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit to recognize the applica-
bility of disparate impact discrimination theory to claims arising
under the ADEA. In Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,244 the Eighth
Circuit held that a college's tenure-based faculty selection plan dispro-
portionately impacted older workers.245 To reduce costs, the college
reserved a certain number of positions for nontenured faculty.246 The
college dismissed the plaintiff, a forty-seven-year-old tenured biology
professor, yet retained a younger, nontenured professor to fill a non-
tenured position.247 Finding that the college failed to demonstrate
that its selection plan was justified by "business necessity," the court
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the
grounds that it is a "factor other than" age, and such practice has an ad-
verse impact on individuals within the protected age group, it can only be
justified as a business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1995). Although not legally binding, courts typically accord such
interpretations considerable deference. See, e.g Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971) ("The administrative interpretation[s] of the Act by the enforcing agency
[are] entitled to great deference."); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743,
748 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983). As the Court observed in Skidmore v. Swift
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), accord Quinn v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 655, 660 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), however, the persuasive value of an interpretative guide-
line "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
238 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
239 Id. at 1030.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
243 Geler, 635 F.2d at 1032 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
244 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
245 Id. at 690-91.
246 Id. at 689-90.
247 Id.
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upheld the district court's finding that the selection plan violated the
ADEA 2 48
The Eighth Circuit's decision to incorporate disparate impact dis-
crimination theory under the ADEA has since been followed by a
number of jurisdictions.2 49 However, courts applying disparate im-
pact theory to ADEA actions have typically done so without engaging
in any meaningful analysis as to why it should apply. 50 Some com-
mentators have sought to fill the gaps left by the courts, citing legisla-
tive intent, statutory language, and the principles behind Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.251 as grounds for extending disparate impact analysis to
ADEA claims.2
52
The applicability of disparate impact discrimination theory to
ADEA claims was first seriously questioned by the Seventh Circuit in
Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.253 The court rejected employees'
claims that their employer's across-the-board cuts in wages and vaca-
tion benefits violated the ADEA, reasoning that the application of dis-
parate impact theory to ADEA cases "would mean that every time an
employer made an across-the-board cut in wages or benefits he was
prima facie violating the age discrimination law. Practices so tenu-
ously related to discrimination, so remote from the objectives of civil
rights law, do not reach the prima facie threshold."2 4
In the aftermath of Hazen Paper, several lower courts, acting on
dicta announced in that case, have held that the disparate impact doc-
trine is not cognizable under the ADEA.25 5 Thus there is no guaran-
248 Id. at 692.
249 See supra note 237.
250 See supra note 237.
251 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
252 See infra note 253.
253 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992). Although the 7th Circuit was the first court to take a
close look at the desirability of extending disparate impact discrimination theory to ADEA
cases, commentators have been debating the appropriateness of applying disparate impact
analysis to ADEA cases for well over a decade. See generally, O'MEnAR, supra note 15, at 138-
42; Blumrosen, supra note 20, at 68-115; Bolick, supra note 108, at 9-11, 13-14; Eglit, supra
note 15; Kaminshine, supra note 36, at 229; Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment
Under theADEA: Variations on a Title VI Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621, 625 n.18 (1983); Player,
supra note 15; Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to the
ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE EL. LJ. 437 (1985); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the
Disparate Impact Doctrine; 34 STAN. L. REv. 837 (1982); Maria Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact
Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MniN. L. REv. 1038 (1984); see also
Evan H. Pontz, supra note 36; Sloan, supra note 140, at 517-25, 539-43.
254 Finnegan, 967 F.2d at 1165.
255 After Hazen Paper, the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania was
the first lower court to reject disparate impact discrimination theory as applied to ADEA
claims. In Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 844 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Pa.),
affd without opinion, 43 F.3d 1461 (3d Cir. 1994), the plaintiff instituted an ADEA action
against his employer alleging discriminatory failure to promote. Citing the "logical incom-
patibility" between a plaintiff's burden of proof under the ADEA and disparate impact
discrimination theory and Congress's failure to sanction the application of disparate im-
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pact theory to ADEA cases when it codified the doctrine under Title VII, the court stated:
"While we are bound by precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which seems to suggest otherwise but pre-dates the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins... we are convinced disparate impact is not a cogni-
zable claim under the ADEAP" Id. at 1076-77 (citations omitted).
In Hiatt v. Union Pacific Railroad, 859 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Wyo. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 838
(10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 917 (1996), the District Court of Wyoming reached
a similar conclusion. In Hiatt the plaintiffs, originally employed by the defendant as
brakemen, were required to accept mandatory promotions to conductor status pursuant to
a congressional mandate. Id. at 1422. The plaintiffs alleged that the mandatory promo-
tion policy deprived them of their seniority, impermissibly discriminating against them on
the basis of age in violation of the ADEA. Id. at 1423. On the issue of whether disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA, the Hiatt court concluded that because age
is a mutable characteristic, "an employer's current employment practices cannot be said to
perpetuate past discrimination against a particular group of older workers." Id. at 1486.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision on limited grounds, expressly declining to resolve
the issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. Hiatt v.
Union Pac. R., 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal circuit court to reject disparate impact dis-
crimination theory as applied to ADEA claims. On facts remarkably similar to Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), see supra notes
238-43 and accompanying text, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School,
41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995), affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment where a private school failed to consider a 63-year-old
applicant with 30 years' experience for a teaching position because he would qualify for a
much higher salary than younger, less experienced candidates. Id. at 1075. The court did
not expressly denounce the applicability of disparate impact discrimination theory to the
ADEA; however, the majority clearly based its decision on the "apparent theory" that Hazen
Paper"precludes the use of the disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA." Id. at
1078 (CudahyJ. dissenting); see also id. at 1077 (observing that "decisions based on criteria
which merely tend to affect workers over the age of forty more adversely than workers
under forty are not prohibited" under the ADEA) (citing Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994)). Despite acknowledgment that years of service "may
be age-correlative," the majority concluded that "'it is incorrect to say that a decision based
on years of service is necessarily age-based,' unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
reason given was a pretext for a stereotype-based rationale." Id. at 1078 (quoting Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)).
In Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuitjoined
the Seventh Circuit, expressly holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable
under the ADEA. Id. at 1007. In Ellis, the plaintiffs filed an ADEA action against United
Airlines after United refused to hire the plaintiffs as flight attendants because the plaintiffs
exceeded United's weight requirements for new flight attendants. Id. at 1000. The plain-
tiffs claimed that United's age-neutral weight requirements had a disparate impact on
older applicants in violation of the ADEA. Id. at 1000-02. In concluding that disparate
impact discrimination theory was not available to ADEA claimants, the court examined the
language, structure, legislative history, and purposes of the ADEA. Id. at 1003-10.
Following Hazen Paper, the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have also expressed
some reservations about extending disparate impact discrimination theory to ADEA claims.
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Hazen Paper
indicates that disparate impact theory is not available under [the] ADEA."); Lyon v. Ohio
Educ. Ass'n & Professional Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995) ("There is
considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate
impact theory .... However, this circuit has stated that a disparate impact theory of age
discrimination may be possible."); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.8d 719, 732
(3d Cir. 1995) (plurality) ("[I]n the wake of Hazen, it is doubtful that traditional disparate
impact theory is a viable theory of liability under the ADEA."); Graffam v. Scott Paper Co.,
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tee that disparate impact discrimination theory will remain a viable
source of protection for ADEA claimants.
2. Too Broad A Sweep: Applying Traditional Disparate Impact
Theory under the ADEA
Whereas a strict application of disparate treatment theory is too
narrow, permitting employers to evade the ADEA by implementing
policies based on criteria that correlate highly with age but are not
directly age-based, traditional disparate impact theory sweeps too
broadly, limiting the range of employers' choices in too many circum-
stances. Broadening the scope of the age proxy doctrine would effect
a more appropriate balancing of employer and employee interests
than would the application of disparate impact discrimination theory
in ADEA cases. 256
Under disparate impact discrimination theory, a plaintiff must
prove, typically by way of statistics, that the employment practice or
policy in question has a disproportionate effect on members of the
protected group. Where a significant disparate impact on a protected
group has been established, an employer may defend his or her ac-
tions only by showing "business necessity" and 'Job relatedness. '257
60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1579
(N.D. Ala. 1994) ("plaintiff has from the outset a heavy burden of persuading the court to
find the existence of liability under a theory that the Supreme Court has explicitly stated it
has not yet accepted"). But see Mangold v. California Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 67 F.Sd 1470,
1474 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that "existing Ninth Circuit precedent approves of a disparate
impact theory under the ADEA"); Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 88 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994)
(applying disparate impact theory to an ADEA claim); Lumpkin v. Brown, 898 F. Supp.
1263, 1271 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (notwithstanding Francis, "it may fairly be assumed that as to
federal employees the courts... would still recognize a disparate impact theory under
Section 633a (as was done pre-FrancisDlj").
256 Many "disparate impact" cases could be more appropriately classified as disparate
treatment/age proxy cases. For example, where an employer utilizes a factor directly cor-
related with and dependent on age, such as experience, pension status, seniority or tenure,
in making an employment decision, such decisions will necessarily have a disproportionate
impact on older workers. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th
Cir. 1988); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981), discussed supra text accompanying notes 238-48. By broadly applying the age
proxy doctrine so as to encompass employment decisions involving time-based factors, one
can still obtain the Geller and Leftwich results without extending ADEA liability to employ-
ment decisions based on legitimate non-age factors such as education or skill require-
ments, which although might disproportionately impact older workers, are not directly tied
to and dependent upon age. See, e.g., Beith v. Nitrogen Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 702 (8th Cir.
1993) (where employee was fired because of a degenerative lumbar disease, the court
stated that although back conditions may be more prevalent in older employees, this fact
in and of itself did not bring the employment decision within the prohibitions of the
ADEA); Stein v. National City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991) (involving an employer
who consistently refused to hire individuals with a college degree).
257 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), a Title VII case, the
Supreme Court reformulated the law of disparate impact discrimination in a number of
ways, including how the burden of persuasion is allocated when adjudicating disparate
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impact claims. Prior to Wards Cove, once the employee demonstrated the disparate impact
of an employer's employment practice, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant
to show the "business necessity" and "job relatedness" of the contested practice. See, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). In Wards Cove,
however, the Supreme Court modified the allocation of and burdens of proof in disparate
impact discrimination cases. A five-four decision, Wards Cove held that once a plaintiff
succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the burden
of production, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the employer, who must provide
evidence of a "business justification for his employment practice." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
659. As the Court explained, when considering the employer's business justification, the
"dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer." Id. Although "a mere insubstantial justification...
will not suffice," under Wards Cove, the challenged practice need not be "'essential' or
'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster." Id. Whereas the "touch-
stone" of this inquiry under Griggs, is "business necessity," 401 U.S. at 431, the "touchstone"
is, under Wards Cove, "a reasoned review of the employer's justification for his use of the
challenged practice," 490 U.S. at 659. The "business necessity" defense announced in
Griggs was thus reduced to a "legitimate business justification" defense under Wards Cove.
For a discussion of the impact of the Wards Cove decision on Griggs and its progeny, see
Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1989).
In 1991, Congress codified disparate impact discrimination under Title VII and re-
stored the doctrine to its pre-Wards Cove formulation. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 places the burden of persuasion
as well as the burden of the production on the defendant to demonstrate "job relatedness"
and "business necessity" once the plaintiff establishes that a specific employment practice
has a disparate impact on members of the protected group. Id.
In his treatise on age discrimination, Professor Eglit observes that "[s]ince the dispa-
rate impact analysis formulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
was supplanted in 1989 by Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, courts addressing disparate
impact claims under the [ADEA] have looked to the latter decision for guidance." 2 EGLrr,
supra note 16, § 7.51, at 7-302 to 7-303. Eglit goes on to argue that since Congress did not
amend the ADEA to incorporate Griggs principles, "even though it had to have known of
the regular, repeated practice of ADEA courts relying on Title VII rulings ... that Wards
Cove was left alive and well, insofar as its analogical force for the ADEA is concerned." Id.
at 7-306. However, nearly all of the courts which have applied Wards Cove analysis to ADEA
disparate impact claims involve claims which arose prior to the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991-November 19, 1991. See, e.g., MacPherson v. University of Montevallo,
922 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 1991); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990).
Courts are, moreover, split as to whether the 1991 Civil Right Act provisions should be
applied retroactively, rendering attempts to draw conclusions from courts' application of
Wards Cove analysis all the more difficult. See, e.g., Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953,
959 (8th Cir. 1994) (disparate impact cases filed before the effective date of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act governed by Wards Cove).
In fact, courts which have recognized disparate impact theory under the ADEA are
generally split as to whether Wards Cove analysis, Griggs principles, or the 1991 Civil Rights
Act provisions should govern the burden of proof in ADEA disparate impact cases. Most of
the courts which have addressed the issue have managed to avoid deciding whether the
disparate impact provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act should apply to ADEA claims. See,
e.g., Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1429 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993); Finnegan v.
Trans World Airlines, 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992); Fisher v. Transco Services-Mil-
waukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992); Leidig v. Honeywell, Inc., 850 F.
Supp. 796, 802 n.5 (D. Minn. 1994). However, one lower court has noted that if courts
were to fail to apply the 1991 Civil Rights Act disparate impact provisions to ADEA cases,
"[d]efendants would reap a windfall from the judicial misinterpretation of disparate im-
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Since the statistical effect of a specific employment practice deter-
mines liability, an employer could be held in violation of the ADEA
even if the employer had not been aware of the ages of his or her
employees or of the impact such a decision might have on older work-
ers. The ADEA by its terms does not subject employment decisions to
a "business necessity" review but expressly permits employers to con-
sider a range of "reasonable factors other than age" in making em-
ployment decisions.
2 58
a. Business Necessity v. The RFOA Exception
The ADEA permits employers to differentiate among employees
or job applicants "where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age."259 The ADEA's RFOA exception is a "mirror
image" of the offense of age discrimination. 260 Unlike the BFOQ ex-
ception, where the employer admits to age-based discrimination and
maintains its necessity, an employer who claims an RFOA exception
asserts that there has been no age discrimination at all. Reasonable
factors other than age may include "factors that sometimes accom-
pany advancing age, such as declining health or diminished vigor and
competence." 261 Some courts have imposed a requirement that "rea-
sonable factors" be job oriented, holding that physical fitness or edu-
cational requirements qualify as an RFOA only when such
requirements are specifically related to, or necessary for, job
performance.2 6
2
The RFOA exception 263 has often been overlooked by the courts.
When it has been cited, it has been subject to a great deal of debate
pact doctrine." Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 394 (D. Me. 1994) (applying
the 1991 Civil Right Act's disparate impact provisions to ADEA claims); see also
Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd, 67 F.3d 291
(3d Cir. 1995) (same).
Given that Congress has demonstrated its general aversion to disparate impact dis-
crimination theory as formulated by Wards Cove and that courts have been reluctant to
apply Wards Cove principles following Congress's enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
Amendments, I have limited my critique of disparate impact theory to traditional disparate
impact theory-that formulated under Griggs and its pre-Wards Cove progeny-which
places the burden of proving "job relatedness" and "business necessity" on the defendant.
258 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1994).
259 Id. § 623(f)(1).
260 Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 132 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 937 (1983).
261 Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).
262 See, e.g., Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 132-33 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
263 The ADEA's legislative history provides little guidance as to the role and import of
its RFOA exception. Introducing the four exceptions to the ADEA, Senator Yarborough
explained the RFOA provision in only the most general of terms:
Where differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age. For
example, if a test shows that a man cannot do certain things. He might fail
to pass the test at 35; he might fail to pass the test at 55. Some men slow up
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not only with respect to the scope of the doctrine but also with respect
to its role in the proof process.264 For instance, some courts and com-
mentators have posited that the RFOA exception "overlaps" the busi-
ness necessity defense applied in disparate impact cases.26 5 Others
sooner than others. If the job requires a certain speed and the differentia-
tion is based upon factors other than age, the law would not apply.
113 CONG. REC. 31253 (1967), reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEG-
ISLATrE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr 144 (1981).
Secretary of Labor Wirtz, testifying in support of the ADEA in 1967, did little better.
When asked by Senator Randolph whether an airline's refusal to train a 45-year-old man to
be a pilot---given that the FAA mandated retirement at age 60 and that the training pro-
gram took three years and was very expensive-would violate the ADEA, Secretary Wirtz
responded:
I would think that where there is a training requirement, that would be a
legitimate factor, that you would weigh the period of usefulness of that per-
son against the period of training that was required, taking full account of
the cost factors and human factors .... I would not think it would be a
violation of the provision to deny employment on those terms.
Age Discrimination in Employment Hearings on S. 830 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 49 (1967).
264 Courts and commentators disagree as to how the RFOA exception should be re-
garded. Some argue that since the RFOA exception follows the BFOQ exception, which is
an affirmative defense to a claim of age discrimination, the RFOA exception should like-
wise be characterized as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers &
Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1992); Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d
544, 552 (9th Cir. 1983), affid on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Cova v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1978); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d
307, 315 (6th Cir. 1975).
Others equate the RFOA exception with the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" explana-
tion an employer must articulate to rebut a presumption of intentional discrimination. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 222-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
820 (1984); lervolino v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (lth Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591-92
(5th Cir. 1978), rehg denied, 582 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1978); CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON
EMPLOYMENr DISCRIMINATION LAw AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
§ 3:89, at 3-38 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that the RFOA exception "is more properly seen as a
refutation of plaintiffs prima facie case"). Still others combine the two. See, e.g., Massarsky v.
General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 132 (3d Cir.) ("reasonable factors" defense will "over-
lap the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason which defendant must articulate to rebut in-
tent to discriminate"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
For a thorough exposition of RFOA doctrine, including the history of the exception,
what constitutes an RFOA, and its use in both disparate treatment and disparate impact
discrimination cases, see generally, Howard Eglit, The Age Disaimination in Employment Act's
Forgotten Defense, 66 B.U. L Rxv. 155 (1986) (maintaining that the RFOA exception should
constitute an affirmative defense in some, but not all, situations).
265 See, e.g. Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 132 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("[I]n disparate impact
cases, the 'reasonable factors' defense will overlap the business necessity upon which the
defendant must rely .... In such cases the 'reasonable factors' must be justified as job
related.., reasonably necessary for the specific work."); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 315 (6th Cir. 1975) (differentiations based on factors other than age can dispro-
portionately impact older workers, requiring employer to show job-relatedness); see also
EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 743-45 (D.C. Pa. 1985) (rejecting
the argument that the existence of the RFOA exception forecloses the application of dispa-
rate impact analysis under the ADEA).
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have gone so far as to equate the two, asserting that the RFOA excep-
tion simply codifies business necessity.2 66
But these courts and commentators fail to recognize the incom-
patibility between the ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age" ex-
ception 267 and disparate impact theory's "business necessity"
defense. 268 The business necessity defense is defined not in terms of
266 See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 264; Player, supra note 15, at 1271-72, 1278-79 (proposing
that, once an employee establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination,
the employer be required to show that his or her decision was "reasonable"); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1995).
267 In light of their textual similarity, the ADEA's RFOA exception has often been
compared to the Equal Pay Act's "factors other than sex" exception. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1) (iv) (1994). In County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981),
the Supreme Court interpreted section 206(d) (1) of the Equal PayAct to preclude applica-
tion of disparate impact theory with its "business necessity" defense to claims under the
EPA, leading some to argue that a similar conclusion should be reached with respect to the
ADEA. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1007-08 (10th Cir. 1996).
268 "The Supreme Court has not been monolithic in its references to 'business neces-
sity.'" Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish-Civil Rights, Quotas,
and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1043, 1073 (1993). For instance, although
the Court initially formulated the defense in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), in each of five cases which intervened between Griggs and Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)-in which the Court rewrote disparate impact discrimina-
tion theory in significant part-the Court defined the "business necessity" defense differ-
ently. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court phrased the
"business necessity" defense as requiring a showing ofjob-relatedness on the part of the
defendant employer. The Albemarle Court held that the challenged employment practice
must be "predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which comprise or are relevant to the job.., for which candidates are being evaluated."
Id. at 431 (citing 29 C.FR. § 1607.4(c)). The Court alternatively defined "business neces-
sity" to mean "essential to effective job performance," Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
331 (1977), "based on legitimate business reasons," Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988), or to require a showing of "legitimate employment goals...
significantly served" by the challenged employment practices "even if they do not require
[it]," New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979). See Leibold et
al., supra, at 1073-74; Pamela L. Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities With Employ-
ers'Legitimate Discretion: The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under
Title Vii, 12 INDUS. REiL. L.J. 1, 11-28 (1990).
In 1991 when Congress codified disparate impact discrimination theory under Title
VII, it purported to codify "the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job relatedness' enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co... . and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove." 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(k) (1994). There has since
been considerable disagreement as to whether Congress sought to impose a strict "business
necessity" standard, as announced in Griggs and Albemarle, or a more relaxed standard
based on the general relationship of the challenged employment practice to the em-
ployer's needs. See, e.g., Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act; 45 RUTGERS L REV. 1011 (1993); Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 921 (1993); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The
Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARv. L. Rrv. 896, 910-13 (1993). As amended, however,
Title VII requires an employer to show both "business necessity" and "job relatedness," 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-(2) (k) (1) (A) (i) (1994). If the plain meaning of the statute is to be given
any effect, the statute must be read to require that an employer prove much more than a
rational relationship between his or her business needs and the employment practice in
question. Although the 1991 Civil Rights Act provisions that codified disparate impact
theory under Title VII do not directly apply to ADEA cases, those courts which have recog-
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reasonableness but rather in terms of necessity. Reasonableness im-
plies a spectrum of alternatives; as to which alternative is the best, rea-
sonable minds may differ. Business necessity, on the other hand, is
much narrower, "limited to those cases where an employer has no
other choice."26 9 Once a plaintiff establishes that a facially neutral
employment practice has a significant discriminatory impact, an em-
ployer must, under the analysis advanced by Griggs and its progeny,
demonstrate that the job practice or requirement has a "manifest rela-
tionship" with the employment to defeat a finding of unlawful dispa-
rate impact discrimination. 270 Even if the employer sustains its
burden of persuasion, an employee may nevertheless prevail if he or
she can establish that a less discriminatory alternative would have
served the employer's interests.
27'
Age discrimination in employment is inherently different from
employment discrimination based on race or sex, to which disparate
impact discrimination theory has traditionally been applied. Unlike
race and gender discrimination, ageism in the workplace is not a rem-
nant of a "legacy of discrimination," nor does it perpetuate a history of
past discrimination.2 72 The dissimilarity between age discrimination
in employment and other more invidious forms of workplace discrimi-
nation justifies the application of different theories of liability in age
discrimination cases than are applied in Title VII cases. 273 By focusing
on the intent of the employer, rather than on the effect of his or her
actions, disparate treatment discrimination theory, as supplemented
by the age proxy doctrine, would most clearly effectuate the purposes
nized disparate impact claims under the ADEA have tended to apply a strict "business
necessity" standard as defined by Griggs. See supra note 257.
269 Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976).
270 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
271 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). As applied in the
ADEA context, see, for example, Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.
1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
272 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Unlike
race or sex, age is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment; age classifications are therefore subject to only a rational
basis review. As the Supreme Court has noted:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of
discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discrimi-
nated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced
a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities.... [O]Id age does not define a "discrete and insular" group
... in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span.
Id. at 313-14.




and policy considerations underlying the ADEA's prohibition of "arbi-
trary" age discrimination in employment.
CONCLUSION
The ADEA is an important weapon in combating ageism in em-
ployment.2 74 Seeking to eradicate demeaning stereotypes about the
abilities and productivity of older workers, the ADEA proscribes "arbi-
trary"275 discrimination in employment "because of' age.276 Full effec-
tuation of its purposes, however, requires that courts recognize that
employers who arbitrarily discriminate "because of'27 7 age rarely com-
municate their discriminatory intent.
The Court took a wrong turn in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. Sub-
stantially narrowing the scope of the age proxy doctrine, Hazen Paper
permits employers to evade the ADEA by implementing employment
decisions based on seemingly non-age criteria that correlate highly
with age. Disparate impact discrimination theory is not an appropri-
ate substitute for safeguarding the legitimate interests protected by
the ADEA. Traditional disparate impact theory sweeps too broadly,
limiting the range of employers' choices in too many circumstances.
In light of the difficulties employees face when attempting to
prove claims of disparate treatment discrimination under the ADEA,
the age proxy doctrine should be accorded a more prominent role in
age discrimination cases than the Court's narrow application of the
doctrine in Hazen Paper allows. The language of the ADEA, its pur-
poses, and the policy considerations underlying its enactment support
a broader application of the age proxy doctrine.
As Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit explained in his dissent to
Massarsky v. General Motors Corp.,2 7 8 "[t] here may be some unavoidable
instances where the ADEA's protection of the older worker has a
countervailing impact on another worthy policy."279 But Congress
thought that protecting older workers was worth it. By requiring em-
ployers to justify all employment decisions in which a time-based fac-
tor is determinative, a more expansive application of the age proxy
doctrine would hold employers accountable for arbitrary age discrimi-
274 As the Seventh Circuit has observed, the ADEA "is a major source of federal litiga-
tion and a growing factor in American labor markets." Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc.,
924 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 1991). In fiscal year 1993, for instance, ADEA claims accounted
for 22.6% of all charges filed with the EEOC, and that percentage is rising. See 1 EGUr,
supra note 16, § 2.01, at 2-6 (1994) (citing EEOC Compliance Manual, News and Develop-
ments 3 (Jan. 31, 1994)).
275 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
276 Id. § 623(a) (1).
277 Id. § 623.
278 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
279 Id. at 135 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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nation accomplished not only through age-based factors, but through
age-correlated factors as well. Broader application of the age proxy
doctrine would ensure that older workers receive the full protection
from arbitrary age discrimination in employment to which they are
entitled under the ADEA.
Toni f Queny
